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5 
Issues and Conclusions 
Brazil’s Foreign Policy under Lula 
Brazil’s foreign policy had traditionally been consid-
ered as highly stable, as “Política de Estado”, in which 
continuity always dominated in the face of partisan or 
personnel changes – an atypical phenomenon in Latin 
America. The mild shifts in policy over the course of 
Brazil’s foreign relations can more likely be traced 
back to an understanding of foreign policy as being 
primarily a means to domestic economic development 
and, therefore, to fluctuations in development strategy. 
In this sense, Brazil was historically described as an 
introverted Lusitanian giant, which – in a Hispanic 
environment that is rather foreign to it – focuses solely 
on its own economic development, dreams of a leader-
ship role and, in the best case scenario, hopes for the 
future. 
Since the end of last century, this characterisation 
had grown obsolete. Following the return of democracy 
in 1985 and the end of the Cold War, an increase 
in Brazil’s involvement in regional and international 
politics became evident. It was primarily during the 
government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–
2002) that the country displayed an increased aware-
ness for international relations – a development that 
peaked during the subsequent presidency of Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010). Especially under his 
government, Brazil launched numerous initiatives 
within the Latin American and the international con-
text, raised its profile by acting as a mediator in proxi-
mate as well as distant conflicts, played an active role 
in international organisations and governance clubs, 
and participated in diverse debates on global govern-
ance. Consequently, it is not far-fetched to describe 
this period as Brazil’s foreign policy ascent. This devel-
opment has been expressed in terms such as regional 
power, leading power, emerging power and regional 
and global player. It is also evident in the acronyms 
IBSA, BRICS or BASIC, which stand for supra-regional 
groups of states with Brazilian participation. 
This change was the result of a continuous expan-
sion of foreign policy activity that had been advanced 
with an extraordinary amount of energy. Contempo-
rary Brazilian foreign policy can no longer be reduced 
simply to foreign trade policy. It has become more 
comprehensive, multi-layered and complex. Topical, 
geographic, institutional and instrumental diversifi-
cations have taken place, with points of emphasis and 
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6 
priorities shifting as well. From a historical perspec-
tive, this constitutes a pronounced change of style and 
approach. Former President Lula, whose discursive 
strategy consisted primarily of emphasising the depar-
ture from the country’s previous (foreign) policy tra-
dition, is considered the most important driving force 
behind this process. What were the foreign policy 
trends during his government and in which frame-
work for action were they embedded? 
1. The following features of Lula’s foreign policy 
deserve closer attention: (1) Erosion of the monopoly 
status of the Ministry for External Relations, due to 
pluralisation, party politicisation and the presidentia-
lisation of foreign policy. (2) South-South orientation, 
based on an intensification of cooperation with devel-
oping countries and newly industrialising countries, 
with a focus on South America and Africa as well as 
the Middle East. (3) An anti-status quo and pro-justice 
discourse, which exposed the unequal distribution of 
material and immaterial resources on a global level, 
activated a North-South cleavage and was reflected 
in selective alliances Brazil entered into with other 
emerging powers, such as IBSA and BRICS (4) The 
international profiling of Brazil as a trading power. 
2. The real innovation during the “Lula Era”, how-
ever, was the termination of the country’s foreign 
policy consensus that had been characteristic for 
Brazil thus far. Among its diplomatic, political and 
societal elites, the degree of cohesion on foreign policy 
issues declined. Yet, the basis of Brazil’s foreign policy 
remained the country’s national consciousness, which 
rests on three main pillars: national unity, apprecia-
tion of territorial size, and a vision of prosperity. The 
Lula government sought to conquer the international 
stage, instrumentalising its national size and socio-
economic success for foreign policy purposes. Within 
the country, the hope for prosperity had been almost 
fulfilled – this fed a feeling of entitlement for recogni-
tion and a more relevant role on the global stage. Na-
tionalism, equality among sovereign states and prag-
matism continued to be guiding principles of Brazil’s 
foreign policy action. But while, in the past, the coun-
try had striven to defend its autonomy primarily 
through distancing itself and withdrawing from the 
international arena, Lula now took a more assertive 
approach – autonomy should now be realised through 
foreign policy participation and diversification. 
 
 SWP Berlin 
Brazil’s Foreign Policy under Lula 
March 2017 
 
 
 
7 
Foreign Policy Context 
 
Traditionally, Brazil’s foreign policy has been carried 
out in a favourable context with few structural ob-
stacles or power constraints. Accordingly, the internal 
and external sovereignty of the country have never 
been seriously threatened over the past 140 years.1 
A number of historical developments throughout the 
last three decades further reduced the factors limiting 
governmental action – including the end of the Cold 
War, the limited US involvement in Latin America, the 
“Northern model’s” loss of legitimacy and the “Asian 
hunger” for South American export products. Thus, an 
array of multiple options opened up for Brazil, which 
not only enabled a transformation of foreign policy, 
but even encouraged such a change. 
One of the prevailing circumstances lending stabil-
ity to Brazil’s foreign policy is the good fortune not 
to be in serious conflict with any other state in the 
region or the world. Accordingly, Nelson Jobim, Minis-
ter of Defence from 2007 until August 2011, confirmed 
that “Brazil has no enemies”.2 One of the few 
uncontested achievements of Mercosur (Mercado Común 
del Sur),3 the Southern Common Market formed in 
1991, was a contribution to the establishment of 
lasting trust between the neighbours. Today, Argenti-
na and Brazil no longer pose a threat to one another.4 
Moreover, Argentina has experienced a foreign policy 
decline. From a Brazilian perspective, this means that 
a competitor (and at this point a benign one) has left 
the regional stage. Already at the outset of the 20th 
century, Brazil succeeded in peacefully resolving 
border conflicts. The country’s territorial integrity 
 
1 On 1 March 2010, Brazil celebrated an unbroken period of 
140 years of peace with its neighbouring countries since the 
end of the War of the Triple Alliance. 
2 Interview with Nelson Jobim: “Una buena defensa es tener 
la capacidad de decir que no” [A Good Defence Is Constituted 
by the Ability to Say No], El País, 28 October 2009. 
3 The Mercosur founding members are Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela signed off on its accession 
in 2006 and was suspended from the block in December 2016. 
Since 2015, Bolivia is in accession process. Except for Brazil, 
all national Parliaments had approved until end 2016 Bo-
livia’s incorporation to Mercosur. 
4 Peter Birle, “Argentinien und Brasilien zwischen Rivalität 
und Partnerschaft” [Argentina and Brazil between Rivalry and 
Partnership], Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 12 (2010): 3–8. 
is not challenged from within, despite its immense 
size.5 But even beyond South America, there are no 
violent conflicts which could carry direct impacts for 
Brazil. This removes certain pressures from Brazil’s 
foreign policy.6 It has long seen itself as a “geopoliti-
cally satisfied country”.7 
Latin America was, for a long time, an important 
sphere of influence of the USA. Apart from this secu-
rity policy circumstance, Brazil had largely seen the 
risks and limitations of its foreign policy dealings in 
terms of economic factors. External vulnerability was, 
therefore, assessed first and foremost in economic 
terms – Brazil’s foreign policy thereby gained a strong 
development policy component (“desenvolventismo”).8 
Since the end of last century, however, there have 
been decisive changes in the field of security and 
development policy, which have expanded Brazil’s 
structural context for action. After 1989, fundamental 
shifts in the strategies and interests of the USA in 
Latin America took place. Following 11 September 
2001 and over the course of the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq (from 2001 and 2003, respectively), Washing-
ton’s engagement in the region was extensively scaled 
back. To date, it has remained at a comparatively low 
level.9 The sole exception here is the fight against 
drug-related criminality in Latin America. US military 
assistance to Colombia plays a crucial role here. Other-
wise, since the new millennium began, the United 
States has no longer focused its foreign and defence 
policy priorities and the corresponding resources on 
its southern neighbours. This “loosening-up” within 
the international and regional arena provided Brazil 
with the space needed to embark on a dynamic and 
 
5 Brazil’s national territory covers 8.5 million square kilo-
metres and shares a border along 15,621 kilometres (exclud-
ing the Atlantic coast) with ten different states. 
6 Peter Hakim, “Brasil: Decisiones de una nueva potencia” 
[Brazil: Decisions of a New Power], Política Exterior, (September 
and October 2010): 86–99. 
7 Marina Regina Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst, “Brazil as 
an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice 
and Responsibilities”, International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 21–40. 
8 Ibid., 22. 
9 The change of power from the Republican George W. Bush 
to the Democrat Barack Obama led to no significant change 
in US policy towards Latin America. 
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8 
formative foreign policy – or, in the words of the 
former Minister for External Relations and current 
Minister of Defence Celso Amorim, a “política externa 
altiva e ativa” (haughty/lofty and active foreign policy).10 
An additional factor that expanded South American 
governments’ scope of action – particularly Brazil’s – 
is trade policy. Demand for South America’s most 
important export products (primarily raw materials) 
increased, which strengthened economies across the 
region. Asian countries, above all China, constituted 
the motor driving this commodity boom.11 It was, 
therefore, not only of crucial importance that the 
export volumes and prices for raw materials surged, 
but also that the rise of a consumer aside from the 
USA and the European Union (EU) meant greater mar-
ket diversification. The fact remains that the inter-
national situation over the last years was extremely 
advantageous for Brazil – both politically and economi-
cally.12 The country demonstrated its robustness even 
when facing the effects of the global economic and 
financial crisis.13 After economic growth had fallen 
from 5.1 percent in 2008 to roughly –0.2 percent in 
2009, a rate of 7.5 percent was reached in 2010.14 
This regional and international framework created 
the conditions for a change in Brazil’s foreign policy; 
four closely tied dimensions should be emphasised in 
this regard: (1) the erosion of the Ministry of External 
Relations’ monopoly over foreign policy issues, (2) a 
South-South orientation, (3) an anti-status quo and 
pro-justice foreign policy discourse and (4) the inter-
national profiling of Brazil as a trading power. 
 
10 Celso Amorim was Minister of External Relations from 
2003 until 2011 and – during the Itamar Franco government 
– 1993 until 1994. From June until September 1993, he acted 
as Secretary General of External Relations. In addition, he 
was a Professor of International Relations Theory at the Uni-
versida de Brasilia. In August 2011 he replaced Nelson Jobim 
as Minister of Defence. 
11 Here “commodities” refer to raw materials or goods that 
are traded on an exchange. This includes non-metallic materials 
such as cacao, sugar and grain as well as metallic raw materials. 
12 Andrew Hurrell, “Brazil: What Kind of Rising State in 
What Kind of Institutional Order?”, in Rising States, Rising Insti-
tutions. Challenges for Global Governance, ed. Alan S. Alexandroff 
and Andrew F. Cooper (Baltimore, 2010), 128–50 (137). 
13 Caroline Silva-Garbade and Claudia Zilla, “Brasilien: Jazz 
auf hohem Niveau” [Brazil: Jazz on a High Level], in Globale 
Ordnungspolitik am Scheideweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanz-
krise, ed. Hanns Günther Hilpert and Stormy-Annika Mildner, 
SWP-Studie 4/2009 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
February 2009), 42–46. 
14 Data from IMF, World Economic Outlook. Slowing Growth, 
Rising Risks, September 2011, 2. 
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The Erosion of the Ministry of External Relations’ 
Monopoly Status 
 
In the past, the high degree of consistency in Brazil’s 
foreign policy was principally attributable to the Ita-
maraty, the country’s Ministry of External Relations, 
known internationally for its professionalism. The 
Ministry had always enjoyed a high level of bureau-
cratic autonomy and was correspondingly shielded 
from the influences of party politics or civil society.15 
Outside the Itamaraty, there was largely a lack of 
foreign policy expertise, especially since foreign affairs 
hardly played a role in electoral campaigns. This guar-
anteed the Ministry a de facto hegemony over this 
policy area. Furthermore, the broad foreign policy con-
sensus among Brazil’s elites fed into the impression 
that technocratic logic was impervious vis-à-vis the 
preferences of party politics. In the “Lula Era”, how-
ever, increasing pressure built up against the monopoly 
status enjoyed by the Itamaraty in formulating and 
implementing foreign policy. This development is 
usually described as a “presidentialisation of foreign 
policy”.16 Two other trends also played a role in this 
development, namely the pluralisation and party 
politicisation of this policy area. 
Pluralisation 
Today, numerous institutions, agencies and actors 
participate in foreign policy making – a tendency that 
has long been evident in most industrialised nations. 
In a horizontal sense, pluralisation constitutes the 
expansion, differentiation (in terms of internal diver-
sification) and, to some extent, the delegation of spe-
cific areas and responsibilities from the Ministry of 
External Relations to other ministries. The key driving 
force behind this development is globalisation. By 
 
15 Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano, “‘Going Global’: An Organi-
zational Study of Brazilian Foreign Policy. Tornando-se Glo-
bal: Um estudo organizacional da política externa brasileira”, 
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 51, no. 1 (2008): 28–52 
(30). 
16 Jeffrey W. Cason and Timothy J. Power, “Presidentializa-
tion, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining 
Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-
Lula Era”, International Political Science Review 30, no. 2 (2009): 
117–40. 
increasing the pressure for specialisation, it breaks up 
the uniformity of state decision-making power. 
In Brazil’s case, there has been an internal fragmen-
tation of the Ministry of External Relations since 2003, 
with a rise in the number of departments within the 
Itamaraty. This was a reaction to new regional and 
global challenges as well as the country’s growing 
level of responsibility within international organisa-
tions. New foreign policy topics and subject areas 
emerged, the result being administrative restructur-
ing.17 The Department of Environmental and Special 
Affairs was established in 2006 with a Division of 
Environmental Policy and Sustainable Development 
(DPAD). “Mixed policy fields” have gained increasing 
importance while, at the same time, becoming more 
and more complex. They force departments that were 
once operated independently to coordinate with each 
other, and push for the internationalisation of minis-
tries that once only carried out domestic policy func-
tions. This advances the creation of inter-ministerial 
agencies.18 
Moreover, there has been a vertical opening of 
foreign policy vis-à-vis non-state actors.19 Other actors 
have joined the diplomatic elite in debates and in 
shaping the decision making process. This is, first and 
foremost, the result of a series of initiatives that pro-
vided targeted support for promoting dialogue with 
civil society on foreign policy issues.20 The Council 
of Entrepreneurs, for instance, was established by 
 
17 Rivarola Puntigliano, “‘Going Global’: An Organizational 
Study of Brazilian Foreign Policy” (see note 15). 
18 One such example is provided by CAMEX (Câmara de 
Comércio Exterior), which was created by a decree from Presi-
dent Cardoso and is the chamber of commerce under the aegis 
of the government council (Conselho de Governo). Key re-
sponsibilities of the External Ministry of External Relations’ 
Undersecretary-General for Cooperation and Trade Promotion 
(SGEC) were transferred to CAMEX. 
19 Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “Alternative Analytical Axes 
of Brazilian Foreign Policy”, International Political Sociology, 
no. 4 (2010): 419–35 (428). 
20 Claudia Zilla, “Brasilien: Eine Regionalmacht mit globalen 
Ansprüchen” [Brazil: A Regional Power with Global Ambitions], 
in Neue Führungsmächte: Partner deutscher Außenpolitik? [New 
Leading Powers: German Foreign Policy Partners?], ed. Jörg 
Husar, Günther Maihold and Stefan Mair, Internationale 
Politik und Sicherheit, vol. 69 (Baden-Baden, 2009), 49–67. 
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10 
Cardoso within the institutional framework of the 
Ministry of External Relations while he served as 
minister. It functions as a consultative and advisory 
body.21 
This horizontal and vertical pluralisation put pres-
sure on the steering role of the Ministry of External 
Relations. The flipside to this development was an 
expansion of the President’s role: today, the President 
exercises orientation and initiative functions related 
to foreign policy that supersede the Ministry. This 
presidentialisation of foreign policy was advanced to 
a tremendous degree under Lula. 
Presidentialisation 
The concept of “presidentialisation” of foreign policy 
refers to a process in which the President becomes 
increasingly involved in diplomatic discussions and 
activities. In the case of the Brazilian executive branch, 
this caused a shift of power from the Ministry of 
External Relations to the Office of the President. In 
a purely quantitative sense, this tendency initially 
manifests itself in the number of times the President 
travels abroad – a figure that was already increasing 
under Cardoso, but reached record highs under Lula.22 
At the same time, these two Presidents were much 
more involved in technical and operative negotiations 
than their predecessors. While this could also be 
traced back to the fact that Cardoso and Lula were 
invited more frequently to summits, the “summitisa-
tion” of international policy does not, however, fully 
explain the pronounced personal engagement of these 
two heads of state – particularly not in Lula’s case. 
Instead, this development is rather a reflection of the 
intentions of Brazil’s leadership. After all, Cardoso and 
Lula were not just jolly frequent travellers, but also 
often hosted foreign visitors themselves. Among other 
things, they intensified their international contacts by 
organising summits within their own country. It was 
Cardoso who initiated efforts to move Brazil from the 
periphery into the centre of international affairs. His 
successor reinforced this trend, which culminated in 
 
21 Celso Amorim, “South American Integration”, Diplomacy, 
Strategy & Politics, no. 10 (October/December 2009): 5–25 (10). 
22 Paulo Roberto de Almeida, “Uma nova ‘arquitetura’ diplo-
mática? Interpretações divergentes sobre a política externa do 
governo Lula (2003–2006)” [A New Diplomatic ‘Architecture’? 
Different Interpretations of the Foreign Policy of the Lula 
Government (2003–2006)], Revista Brasileira de Política Inter-
nacional 49, no. 1 (2006): 95–116 (100). 
both the football World Cup 2014 as well as the Olym-
pic Games 2016 being awarded to Brazil – two of the 
world’s largest and most commercially important 
sporting events. These made the South American coun-
try an international venue and ultimately a global 
brand.23 
A further indicator of the increase in presidential 
diplomacy can be found in the presidents’ personal 
participation in international negotiations. Up until 
16 years ago, it had primarily been Brazil’s Minister of 
External Relations or other high-level representatives 
from the Itamaraty or the respective embassies, who 
had represented their country during such rounds of 
negotiation. In order to fulfil this diplomatic role in 
person, Cardoso and Lula had special, albeit different, 
resources at their disposal. Cardoso was able to draw 
on past foreign policy experience, direct knowledge 
in the area and international contacts that he had 
accumulated while serving as Minster of External 
Relations (October 1992 until May 1993) during the 
Itamar Franco government (1992–1994).24 Lula was 
superbly prepared for dealing with complex negotia-
tion processes, as a long-serving union leader within 
the metalworking industry. 
Overall, presidential diplomacy has contributed to 
the ongoing erosion of the Itamaraty’s monopoly over 
foreign policy matters as well as the ministerial logic 
in this policy area. Presidents are subject to elections. 
Therefore, they have a more short-dated time horizon 
and must also pay attention to a larger portion of the 
public than the Ministry of External Relations. Conse-
quently, party political viewpoints gain greater influ-
ence over foreign policy actions. In the Brazilian case, 
this development was closely linked to the positions of 
the two politicians within their own parties. Cardoso 
and Lula were both among the founders of the two 
most influential political parties of re-democraticised 
Brazil – Cardoso a founder of the PSDB (Partido da Social 
Democracia Brasileira) and Lula a founder of the PT (Par-
tido dos Trabalhadores).25 Both also succeeded in being 
re-elected to the presidency and therefore served terms 
totalling eight years each.26 This highlighted the popu-
 
23 Peter Hakim, “Rising Brazil: The Choices of a New Global 
Power”, Política Externa, 1 July 2010, http://www.thedialogue. 
org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2273 (accessed 19 Septem-
ber 2011). 
24 Hurrell, “Brazil: What Kind of Rising State?” (see note 12), 
142. 
25 Cason and Power, “Presidentialization, Pluralization, and 
the Rollback of Itamaraty” (see note 16), 126. 
26 Brazil’s constitution only allows for a direct re-election. 
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larity of the politicians within their own country. Lula 
left office with an approval rating of 80 percent. His 
popularity, however, extended far beyond the national 
borders. In Latinobarómetro 2009, Lula ranked second 
behind Barack Obama on the popularity scale of heads 
of state and government in America and Spain.27 
Party Politicisation 
Many authors attempt to explain the party politicisa-
tion of foreign policy, which took place under Lula, 
using an approach that could be characterised in a 
Freudian sense as “policy sublimation”.28 According 
to this explanation, the process entails a redirection 
of party preferences away from the original focus on 
a core element of national policy – financial or eco-
nomic policy – towards another policy field that had 
previously been of less central importance. Lula pur-
sued a relatively orthodox economic policy,29 which 
was closer to the principles of the Cardoso govern-
ment than to the PT programme. His foreign policy, 
however, corresponded fully with the self-conceptions 
and discourse of the PT. He favoured a South-South 
orientation involving increased engagement within 
South America. For guidance, Lula relied on an equity 
discourse that denounced socio-economic and power-
political asymmetry on a global level. This policy also 
entailed the cultivation of “solidary relations” with 
leftist governments, particularly those in Latin 
America.30 
In an ideological sense, Lula’s foreign policy orien-
tation compensated his party for an economic policy 
 
27 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2009 [Report 2009], 
(Santiago de Chile, November 2009), http://www.oas.org/en/ 
ser/dia/outreach/docs/INFORME_LATINOBAROMETRO_2009% 
5B1%5D.pdf (accessed 19 September 2011). 
28 For example: Hurrell, “Brazil: What Kind of Rising State?” 
(see note 12), 137; Celso Lafer, A identidade internacional do 
Brasil e a política externa brasileira. Passado, presente e futuro [The 
International Identity of Brazil and Brazilian Foreign Policy. 
Past, Present and Future], (São Paulo, 2009), 141. 
29 Under orthodox economic policy, monetary and fiscal 
policy are oriented towards the preservation of macro-eco-
nomic stability. 
30 Lula distanced himself from the PT’s “genuine” foreign 
policy approach with regard to economic issues. He strove 
to transform Brazil into an architect of globalisation – while 
at the same time the party was traditionally characterised 
by state-centric nationalism, anti-hegemonism and mistrust 
vis-à-vis foreign capital, free trade and global markets. See 
Roberto de Almeida, “Uma nova ‘arquitetura’ diplomática?” 
(see note 22), 101. 
that was not aligned with the PT; at the same time, 
this allowed him to draw a clear contrast between 
himself and his predecessor Cardoso. Certainly, the 
President was also focused on putting his own beliefs 
into practice and bolstering his political profile. Aside 
from Lula’s own personal and psychological motiva-
tions, however, it is clear that the PT had traditionally 
disposed of a fully developed foreign and regional 
policy programme, an active Secretariat for Inter-
national Relations as well as contacts with social 
movements beyond Brazil’s borders.31 Among other 
things, the above-described “policy reversal” explains 
the seemingly ironic circumstance of Lula visiting the 
World Economic Forum in Davos just as naturally as 
its respective counter event, the World Social Forum – 
as both a favourite of the economic elite and as the 
great hope of the social movements. 
In line with Brazilian tradition, not a single ambas-
sador under Lula came from political circles – even the 
Minister of External Relations, Celso Amorim, was a 
career diplomat.32 The Ministry’s technocratic profile, 
however, was weakened when Amorim joined the PT 
in September 2009.33 The actions of Ambassador 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães had a similar effect. He 
was the acting Secretary General for External Rela-
tions until October 2009, making him the second in 
command at the Itamaraty.34 While this position had 
already been of great importance for the formulation 
and implementation of foreign policy in the past, the 
post’s influence had played out within the govern-
ment itself. Pinheiro Guimarães’ exercise of office, 
however, had a much stronger external, public ori-
entation. He fostered his reputation as the govern-
ment’s foreign policy “ideologue” by maintaining a 
distinctive presence within the media and journals – 
 
31 Ibid., 98. 
32 Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations has the uncommon 
privilege – in a Latin American context – of having sole re-
sponsibility for the filling of posts within its areas of respon-
sibility. This has a positive impact in terms of consistency in 
personnel as well as homogeneous socialisation, which in 
turn improves continuity in terms of content, Rivarola Pun-
tigliano, “‘Going Global’: An Organizational Study of Brazili-
an Foreign Policy” (see note 15), 31. 
33 This occurred shortly before the deadline that needed 
to be met in order to present candidate lists for the October 
elections. Even though Amorim did not participate in the 
end, he initially refused in interviews to exclude the pos-
sibility of a PT candidacy. 
34 Guimarães’s successor was Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, 
who had been Brazil’s ambassador in Washington up until 
that point. In early 2011, Patriota took over the post of Minis-
ter of External Relations in the Dilma Rousseff government. 
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for example, by authoring opinion pieces that often 
transcended foreign policy topics. 
The political clout of the two highest ranking diplo-
mats, however, was not only relativised by Lula’s for-
eign policy activism. In addition to the Minister of 
External Relations, the Secretary General for External 
Relations and the President, there was a fourth figure, 
who enjoyed considerable influence and prominence: 
Lula’s foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio García. 
The function of the President’s advisor, a post filled in 
previous governments by diplomats, was originally to 
“directly and discretely” support the President in the 
role of a “note-taker” or “introdutor diplomático”.35 How-
ever, the post’s profile fundamentally changed under 
Lula’s government. García was a long-serving PT Secre-
tary for External Relations. His regular domestic and 
international public appearances could be regarded a 
PR campaign for the government. At times, the media 
spoke of a division of labour – the Minister of External 
Relations was responsible for global issues, while the 
President’s advisor dealt with regional affairs. This 
double-track foreign policy, i.e. presidential and minis-
terial, but at the same time “party politicised” policy 
was exercised without major institutional or personal 
conflicts arising. This can be traced back to Lula’s inte-
gration efforts36 and the unifying party political ele-
ment within the “foreign policy quadriga” consisting 
of Lula, García, Amorim and Pinheiro Guimarães. 
 
 
 
35 Roberto de Almeida, “Uma nova ‘arquitetura’ diplomática?” 
(see note 22), 98. 
36 Günther Maihold, Too Big a World? Lula, Brazil and the Middle 
East, Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI), 62/2010 (Madrid: 
Real Instituto Elcano, 17 May 2010), http://www.realinstituto 
elcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_ 
CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/latin+america/ari62-
2010 (accessed 19 September 2011). 
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South-South-Orientation 
 
Over the “Lula Era”, Brazil increasingly turned to the 
“Southern” states and regions. This is immediately 
evident in the frequency with which he focused on 
corresponding destinations within the context of his 
travelling diplomacy. Brazil made efforts to consoli-
date its role as a regional power in South America, 
to expand its presence in Africa and to intensify its 
relations with the Arab world. 
South America 
Traditionally, Brazil had not seen itself as a Latin Ameri-
can country, but rather just a country in Latin America.37 
It was only the country’s process of growing accept-
ance regarding its own “geographic fate” that made 
the creation of Mercosur in the 1990s possible. From 
2003, this development fed into target-oriented policy 
based on the construction of a South American iden-
tity. During Lula’s presidency, the country moved 
away from a (vague) Latin American identity towards 
a (more clearly defined) South American identity.38 
In justifying why the term “South America” was pre-
ferred over “Latin America”, Minister of External 
Relations Celso Amorim indicated that South America 
constitutes a geopolitical entity on its own; the devel-
opments in this region differ from those taking place 
in Mexico, Central America or the Caribbean. He also 
stated that a particularly high degree of confidence 
and self-assertion is evident in this particular region. 
According to Amorim, South America is nobody’s 
backyard and China displaced the USA and the EU and 
relegated them to the region’s second and third most 
important trading partners.39 
 
37 Hurrell, “Brazil: What Kind of Rising State?” (see note 12), 
142. 
38 Wolf Grabendorff, “Brasiliens Aufstieg: Möglichkeiten und 
Grenzen regionaler und globaler Politik” [The Rise of Brazil: 
Opportunities and Limits of Regional and Global Policy], Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 12 (2010): 16–22 (18). 
39 “I use the term ‘South America’ here, rather than ‘Latin 
America’, because despite the obvious historical affinities that 
bring together the whole of Latin America and Caribbean 
countries, South America constitutes a distinct geopolitical 
entity. It is very different from what happens in Central 
America and Mexico and, to some extent, the Caribbean”, 
These arguments clearly show which states and 
regions Brazil referred to during the Lula government 
in defining its regional identity. First, the boundary 
to construct this identity ran between Colombia and 
Panama. In a manner of speaking, Central America 
and Mexico (as well as the Caribbean) were thus ex-
cluded from Brazil’s “actual” gravitational field. This 
is tied to the second dimension of this identity, namely 
the relationship with the USA. During the Lula govern-
ment, Washington’s influence reached a low point 
in the history of inter-American relations, above all in 
South America. Third, China’s rise as an economic 
power provided the South American nations with an 
alternative business partner and therefore introduced 
more latitude for action into their relations with the 
USA and the EU. China has become one of South Ameri-
ca’s most important trading partners; at the same 
time its role as a source of foreign direct investment 
in the region has expanded. This provided the material 
basis for Brazil’s growing confidence, which Lula ex-
pressed as follows: “Our critics are those who believe 
that when we wake in the morning, we have to ask the 
USA for permission to sneeze and Europe for permis-
sion to cough.”40 
The unusual frequency – compared to other high-
level Brazilian politicians – with which President Lula 
and Minister of External Relations Amorim visited 
countries in the sub-continent was an expression of 
South American identity.41 Brazil’s geopolitical atten-
 
Celso Amorim, Second Plenary Session: Security Systems and Insti-
tutions: Regional Perspectives. The 8th IISS Global Strategic Review: 
Global Security Governance and the Emerging Distribution of Power, 
11 September 2010, 2. 
40 From Lula during his final press conference as Brazil’s 
President, as quoted in La Nación, 28 December 2010, 2 (trans-
lated from the original Spanish by the author). 
41 Amorim pointed to this development – the new foreign 
policy approach becomes particularly conspicuous due to his 
statement that he served as Minister of External Relations 
under Itamar Franco as well as Lula: “I had served as Minister 
of External Relations under Itamar Franco’s Government, 
although for only one year and a half, and I never visited 
Peru, Ecuador, Guayana, or Suriname during that time. Under 
President Lula’s Government, I have been six times to Peru, 
three or four times to Ecuador, and many times to Colombia 
– a significant change in dynamics”, Amorim, “South Ameri-
can Integration” (see note 21), 15. 
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tion to the sub-region was emphasised on a formal 
level with the creation of the Unión Suramericana de 
Naciones (UNASUR, Union of South American Nations) 
in 2008.42 According to the vocabulary of South 
American politicians, UNASUR represents a political 
and economic integration project. The Union, how-
ever, has been developing less into an integrated 
economic zone and more into an institutional frame-
work for action, low-intensity policy coordination and 
ad-hoc conflict management. From Brazil’s stand-
point, UNASUR contributes, above all, to the country’ 
own political and strategic clout and its own position 
in the region. In regards to Brazil’s foreign policy 
projection, South America also takes on greater im-
portance vis-à-vis the core Cono Sur region (the portion 
of the sub-continent below the Tropic of Capricorn). 
Amorim’s comparison of UNASUR and Mercosur 
underlines this: “From a foreign policy perspective, 
I believe that South America has at least as much 
clout as Mercosur, if not more, because the problems 
confronting the region extend beyond the boundaries 
of Mercosur.”43 
UNASUR thus provided the South American sub-
continent with the quality of an entity.44 At the same 
time, however, it extended Brazil’s radius of activity 
beyond the Cono Sur and marked a sphere of action 
from which the USA was kept away as far as possible, 
institutionally as well as in terms of power politics. 
Accordingly, Brazil was strongly opposed to any 
form of participation by Washington in the Consejo 
de Defensa Suramericano (CDS), the South American 
Defence Council of the UNASUR, which was created 
on initiative of Lula in 2008.45 Correspondingly, the 
reaction of Lula and most of the Presidents of the 
 
42 Grabendorff, “Brasiliens Aufstieg” [The Rise of Brazil] 
(see note 38), 18. 
43 Original text: “From the standpoint of external, inter-
national policy, I believe South America has as much, if not 
greater weight, as Mercosur, as the great issues faced by the 
region in general transcend Mercosur boundaries”, Amorim, 
“South American Integration” (see note 21), 21. 
44 Ibid., 17. 
45 According to statements from the Lula government, 
under no circumstances was the CDS to become a “SATO”, 
that is, a NATO for the South providing the framework for 
representing US interests and carrying out joint military 
operations. The CDS should serve more as a platform for 
coordination of defense policy without infringing on the 
principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention, 
Günther Maihold and Claudia Zilla, Geteilte Sicherheit in Latein-
amerika. Neue subregionale Initiativen und das Engagement der 
USA, SWP-Aktuell 36/2008 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, May 2008). 
UNASUR countries was negative when the Colombian 
government of Álvaro Uribe decided in August 2009 
to authorize the USA to use seven military bases in the 
country.46 Without providing a concept for an alter-
native regional solution to the armed conflict in Co-
lombia47 and the transnational drug problems in the 
region, Lula opposed an increase in US-military pres-
ence in the neighbourhood. Nevertheless, in April 2010, 
he signed an agreement for military cooperation with 
Washington, which was meant, first and foremost, to 
promote economic cooperation in the defence sector. 
By repeatedly taking on the role of a conflict man-
ager in South America, Brazil met the objective of 
keeping Washington’s influence small. The focus was 
on ensuring stability within individual states or 
friendly relations between governments. In this con-
nection, Lula established a series of “Groups of Friends” 
during his presidency, which served as mediators 
in various conflicts within or among South Ameri-
can countries.48 This demonstrated that the Brazilian 
government had become a recognised mediator in 
South America. Even when regional institutions 
(OAS, UNASUR, Rio Group) provided the framework 
for action, conflict management mainly took place in 
an informal and highly inter-governmental manner 
through the creation of ad-hoc groups and mostly on 
initiative or under leadership of the Brazilian Presi-
dent. In addition to these “mediation interventions”, 
there was another innovation. During elections in 
neighbouring countries, Lula publicly sided with spe-
cific presidential candidates, with particular vigour in 
the cases of Bolivia and Paraguay. This behaviour also 
signalled an important development in Brazil’s for-
eign policy: there was a de facto abandonment of the 
principle of non-interference into the domestic affairs 
of third countries – a maxim that had long been strictly 
observed.49 Within Brazil’s (foreign) policy elite, this 
sparked controversy, particularly due to the promi-
nent role played by Lula himself in this development.50 
 
46 This happened after Ecuador decided not to extend the 
treaty for the US military base in Manta, which had expired 
in September 2009 after a period of ten years. 
47 This refers to the violent conflict linked to drug traffick-
ing that exists between guerilla groups, paramilitary units 
and the state security apparatus. 
48 For example: “Group of Friends of Venezuela” (January 
2003), “Group of Friends of Bolivia” (September 2008), “Group 
of Friends of Venezuela and Colombia” (February 2010). 
49 Soares de Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State 
and Regional Power” (see note 7), 32. 
50 For example: Rubens Ricupero, “The Main Lineaments 
of Brazil’s Current Foreign Policy”, in Brazilian Foreign Policy. 
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In this context, however, attention must be paid to 
the cases in which Lula was not willing to “interfere” 
or in which he did seek dialogue, but rather took an 
unyielding position himself. An example of the first 
scenario is the conflict between Argentina and Uru-
guay that centred around the construction of two 
cellulose plants on the Uruguayan side of Uruguay 
River, which marks the border between the two coun-
tries. This conflict was not resolved until 2010. The 
2009 crisis in Honduras provides an example of the 
second scenario. Brazil did not exactly play the role 
of a neutral party striving for reconciliation. Instead, 
“South America’s mediator” positioned itself at the 
top of a group of hardliners, who were opposed to 
efforts to resolve the conflict in the Central American 
country through elections.51 Therefore, it seems ques-
tionable whether Brazil’s activities as a mediator 
within South America followed a different logic than 
within the tighter boundaries of Mercosur or in dis-
tant Central America. It can be suspected that Lula’s 
decisions with regard to other contexts (Mercosur, 
Central America) were designed to support Brazil’s 
role as the regional power in South America. Accord-
ingly, the President accepted the negative conse-
quences for the consolidation of Mercosur and the 
stabilisation of Honduras in order to raise Brazil’s 
profile in South America and to gain popularity 
within his own party. 
At times, this understanding of Lula’s role entailed 
that political objectives gained precedence over eco-
nomic considerations. This often came at the expense 
of economic interests and, therefore, the Brazilian 
President was harshly criticized within his own coun-
try, for instance, for his “lenience”, his “olympic 
patience” and his “diplomacy of generosity” towards 
Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales, the Presidents of Vene-
zuela and Bolivia. Many times, the opposition accused 
Lula of not pursuing national, but rather his own 
party political interests.52 
 
Present and Future, ed. Fundaçao Liberdade e Ciudadania 
[Foundation for Liberty and Citizenship] (Washington, D.C., 
2010), 7–16. 
51 Only the “conflict politicians” were not allowed to stand 
as candidates during these elections, namely the deposed 
President Manuel Zelaya and the de-facto President Roberto 
Micheletti. 
52 For a critique of Lula’s dealings with ideologically like-
minded governments in Latin America, see, among others, 
the articles in Brazilian Foreign Policy, ed. Fundaçao Liberdade 
e Ciudadania (see note 50), as well as Georges D. Landau, 
“A Diplomacia Latino-Americana do Governo Lula” [The Latin 
American Diplomacy of the Lula Government], in O Brasil no 
Within scholarly and policy circles, it is often 
claimed that Brazil bore the political and economic 
costs (burden sharing) related to its leadership role in 
the sub-continent and the consolidation of regional 
institutions reluctantly. In light of the foreign policy 
actions described here, this argument should be 
relativised or at least reformulated more precisely. The 
foreign policy the Lula government embarked on did 
not contribute in any notable way to the formation of 
supra-national institutions or to a reduction in the 
regional asymmetries in South America. Moreover, it 
undermined deeper integration within the Mercosur 
as well as its international projection.53 In fact, inte-
gration and international projection did not appear 
to be priorities of Brazilian regional policy. Moreover, 
the government did not consider the loss of sovereignty 
and financial burdens a “price” worth paying. The 
situation was different, however, with the economic 
costs that Lula willingly paid in order to be “every-
body’s friend” or the “good guy”, because this helped 
him gain recognition as a mediator in South America. 
Africa 
As Brazil has turned its focus to the global South, Africa 
also received greater attention. Relations between 
Brazil and Africa showed an extremely dynamic devel-
opment over the two presidential periods of Lula on 
diplomatic, political and economic levels. This was a 
novelty in the country’s foreign policy. Lula dedicated 
his first visit to Africa in November 2003 to the issue 
of Brazil’s historical debt towards the continent. He 
hereby created the framework for interpretation of 
the heightened transatlantic interest. Brazil imported 
(until 1850) and enslaved (until 1888) approximately 
four million Africans. Today, the country is home to 
the largest population of people of African descent 
outside Africa. In leadership positions, however, this 
segment of the population continues to be consider-
ably under-represented.54 In the context of a worldwide 
 
contexto político regional [Brazil in a Regional Policy Context], 
ed. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Cadernos Adenauer XI/2010, 
no. 4 (2010), 11–24. 
53 Among other things, the promotion of UNASUR as a 
policy and strategy platform was responsible for this. 
54 Günther Maihold, “Die brasilianische Afrikapolitik – 
neues Engagement oder bewusster Pragmatismus?” [Brazil’s 
Africa Policy – New Commitment or Conscious Pragmatism], 
in Brasilien. Großmacht in Lateinamerika, Argumente und Mate-
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process of increasingly returning to ethnic affiliations 
and, accordingly, the politicisation of ethnicity and 
collective identity, Brazil, too, witnessed the emer-
gence of a movement that has critically examined 
the myth of the country’s “racial democracy” and the 
homogeneous “national culture” since the mid-1980s. 
In Lula’s Africa policy, the entanglement of a national 
search for identity and the country’s conception of its 
foreign policy role were particularly evident. The soli-
darity with the developing and emerging nations that 
the President generally expressed was, therefore, sup-
plemented with the recognition of responsibility, his-
torical ties and cultural affinities towards the region. 
On a diplomatic level, this special relationship was 
expressed in three different manners. First, no other 
Brazilian President visited Africa as frequently as Lula. 
Over the course of his two terms, he visited 27 African 
states – more than the sum of all countries on the con-
tinent visited by all of his predecessors.55 Visits to the 
region by Minister of External Relations Amorim were 
similarly frequent. Second, a number of Brazilian em-
bassies, which had been closed under Cardoso, were 
re-opened in Africa during the Lula government (among 
others, Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, Yaoundé, Kin-
shasa, Lomé and Lusaka).56 Brazil established new em-
bassies in other capitals across the continent (among 
others, São Tomé, Khartoum, Cotonou, Gaborone, 
Conakry, Malabo). Between 2003 and 2009, a total of 
17 diplomatic missions were (re-)opened across the 
continent.57 The number of ambassadors from African 
states accredited in Brazil rose accordingly. Third, the 
improved relations with Africa led to an administra-
tive restructuring within the Brazilian Ministry of 
External Relations. The Africa division was separated 
from the original joint Department for Africa and the 
Middle East. It was expanded and raised to the status 
of an independent regional department (DEAF). In 
addition to Africa-I (DAF-I) and Africa-II (DAF-II), a third 
division was created (DAF-III).58 
 
rialien zum Zeitgeschehen, 55, ed. Bernd Rill (Munich: Hanns-
Seidel-Stiftung, 2007), 73–91 (73). 
55 Paulo Fagundes Visentini, Prestige Diplomacy, Southern Soli-
darity or “Soft Imperialism”? Lula’s Brazil-Africa Relations (2003 on-
wards), April 2009, 3, Conference paper, http://www.ascleiden. 
nl/PDF/seminarvisentini.pdf (accessed 19 September 2011). 
56 While there were 34 Brazilian diplomats in Africa in 1989, 
this number dropped to 24 during the Cardoso presidency, 
ibid., 3. 
57 Statement from Celso Amorim in ABC, Brazilian Technical 
Cooperation in Africa (Brasilia, 2009), 5. 
58 Cláudio Oliveria Riberio, “A política africana do governo 
de Lula (2003–2006)” [The Africa Policy of the Lula Govern-
Within the context of South-South relations, “hori-
zontal cooperation” with Africa was considered very 
important. Accordingly, Brazil regarded itself particu-
larly competent in promoting development. As Minis-
ter of External Relations Amorim stated, due to its 
own experiences Brazil has a special understanding 
of Africa’s problems as well as proven solutions that 
could be transferred.59 Since 2005, through its Agência 
Brasileira de Cooperaçao (ABC, the development agency 
within the Ministry of External Relations), Brazil has 
signed framework agreements for technical coopera-
tion (TC) with more than a dozen African states and 
with the African Union.60 Moreover, the Lula govern-
ment cancelled bilateral debts with a number of Afri-
can states while also providing new loans. The im-
portance of cultural affinity towards Africa was also 
evident within the TC framework, as the principal 
lines of support have affected the lusophone coun-
tries, i.e. those that speak Portuguese. Of the TC fund-
ing provided by Brazil to Africa, 55 percent was given 
to Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and 
Príncipe as well as Cape Verde. Africa, particularly the 
Lusophone part, also took on greater prominence in 
Brazil’s external cultural policy. The Comunidade dos 
Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP, Community of Por-
tuguese Language Countries), founded in 1996, rep-
resented a focus area of Brazil’s Africa policy.61 The 
multilateral forum includes Brazil and Portugal as 
 
ment (2003–2006)], Tempo social, revista de sociología da USP 21, 
no. 2 (2009): 185–209 (187 f.). 
59 Amorim described special aspects and advantages of this 
type of international cooperation as follows: “Several chal-
lenges faced by African countries are not unknown to Brazil, 
a country where inequality is still very substantial. Contrib-
uting to the development of Africa through the sharing of 
solutions we found to our very own problems is the chief pur-
pose of our technical cooperation”, in ABC, Brazilian Technical 
Cooperation in Africa (see note 57), 5. 
60 In 2005, Brazil signed framework cooperation agreements 
with Botswana, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Benin, Gambia and Equa-
torial Guinea, in 2006, with Zambia und Tanzania, in 2007, 
with the African Union and Rwanda, in 2009, with Swaziland 
and Sierra Leone, and, in 2010, with Lesotho. 
61 To promote research and scientific exchange, the Pro-
gramme for Undergraduate Students (PEC) was expanded. 
It had already been created during the military dictatorship 
and then also included graduate students. In July 2006, the 
Brazilian city of Salvador da Bahia served as the venue for 
the “Second Conference of Intellectuals from Africa and the 
Diaspora and the African Renaissance”. The international 
broadcast of “TV Brazil”, the state television station founded 
in 2008, is received in Africa. In addition, the region has long 
been an important market for the beloved Brazilian tele-
novelas. 
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well as East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São 
Tomé and Príncipe, Mozambique and Angola. 
The Brazilian government’s decision to strengthen 
relations with Africa was interpreted by domestic 
opposition parties as part of a strategy focused on 
consolidating the necessary support within the UN 
General Assembly to secure a permanent seat on the 
Security Council. “This is the only explanation for why 
Brazil opened a dozen embassies in countries of no 
relevance.”62 Critics of Lula denounced this costly 
policy arguing that too much was bet on an uncertain 
hand that might not even get to be played if the aspired 
reform of the UN institutions would not occur. 
Brazil’s Africa orientation can, however, also be 
viewed in light of economic interests. For if one shifts 
the focus from development and external cultural 
policy to trade and investment policy towards Africa, 
then a different setting of priorities becomes apparent 
– one which is predominantly centred around secur-
ing raw materials and markets.63 This economic strat-
egy has led many observers to conclude that Brazil was 
exercising a type of “soft imperialism” here.64 But even 
though the trade volume between Brazil and Africa 
has more than quintupled since 2003, it remains at 
quite a low level.65 Brazil’s prioritisation, within its 
trade relations with Africa, of securing raw materials 
is revealed not only through the range of Brazil’s im-
port products, but also through the concentration on 
specific states as trading partners.66 Brazil’s invest-
ment policy in Africa paints a similar picture. On the 
other hand, the financial resources that Brazil ex-
pended on development cooperation remained very 
limited. So did its efforts towards creating value chains 
across the continent. The interest in resources, there-
fore, played the key role in economic relations with 
 
62 For example, the attempted explanation from Landau, “A 
Diplomacia Latino-Americana do Governo Lula” (see note 52), 
12 (Translation from the original Portuguese by the author). 
63 Gerhard Seibert, Brasilien in Afrika: Globaler Geltungsanspruch 
und Rohstoffe [Brazil in Africa: Global Claims and Resources], 
GIGA Focus, no. 8 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies [GIGA], 2009). 
64 Fagundes Visentini, Prestige Diplomacy, Southern Solidarity or 
“Soft Imperialism”? (see note 55), 3. 
65 On trade relations between Brazil and Africa, see the chap-
ter “Brasilien als Handelsmacht” [Brazil as a Trade Power], 
26ff. 
66 In addition to oil, Brazil primarily imported minerals as 
well as plant and animal resources from Africa between 2000 
and 2010, while the states in Africa mainly imported sugar 
and derivatives (bio-ethanol), meat and processed products 
from Brazil. 
Africa – this casts a shadow over Lula’s discourse on 
South-South solidarity. 
Lula sought to create a platform for dialogue for 
both focus regions in Brazil’s South-South policy by 
launching an initiative supporting regular summits 
between America and South Africa (Cumbre América del 
Sur-África, ASA). For the first time, their heads of state 
and governments assembled in November 2006 in 
Abuja, Nigeria. In the Abuja Declaration,67 they recog-
nised the necessity of cooperating in multilateral 
formats, such as the UN, WTO and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, and the necessity for working towards 
their reform. Moreover, they supported cooperation 
across diverse political, economic and social areas. The 
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (ASACOF) was 
created as an executive body, with its activities coordi-
nated from Brazil and Nigeria. Although a decision 
was made in Abuja to meet on a regular two-year cycle, 
the second summit did not take place until September 
2009 on the island of Margarita in Venezuela.68 The 
third ASA summit was originally planned for Septem-
ber 2011 in Libya.69 In light of the developments in 
this country, the summit was finally held in February 
2013 in the city of Malabo (Equatorial Guinea).70 
Middle East 
The extent of the “expansion” and diversification 
of Brazil’s foreign policy as described here can also 
be traced back to the fresh impetus in the relations 
between Brazil and the Middle East. Lula was the first 
President of the Republic of Brazil to visit this region. 
 
67 ASA, Abuja Declaration (Abuja, 26–30 November 2006), 
http://www2.mre.gov.br/deaf/asa/declaration%20of%20the%20
first%20-%20%28english%29.pdf (accessed 27 October 2011). 
68 See ASA, Declaración de Nueva Esparta, II Cumbre América 
del Sur – África. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Isla de 
Margarita, Nueva Esparta [Declaration from Nueva Esparta II 
Summit South America – Africa, Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela, Isla de Margarita, Nueva Esparta], 26/27 September 2009. 
69 Lula entered Libyan territory in June 2009 as a guest of 
honour at the African Union Summit. 
70 An additional format that links the two shores of the 
Atlantic is the Zona de Paz y Cooperación del Atlántico Sur 
(ZPCAS, South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone) created 
within the UN framework on a Brazilian initiative in 1986. 
The following countries are party to the ZPCAS: Angola, 
Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, DR 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, São 
Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo 
and Uruguay. 
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Just as in the case of Africa, he worked to emphasise 
the development policy and cultural commonalities 
between the “foreign region” and Brazil as a multi-
ethnic emerging country. Among other things, the 
justification for this new affinity was that the South 
American nation is home to some 10 million people 
of Arab ancestry, who live in peace and harmony with 
120,000 Jews. 
In this case, Lula also followed a course of “summit 
diplomacy” and the linking of focus regions. He ini-
tiated the Cúpula América do Sul-Países Árabes (ASPA, 
Summit of South American-Arab Countries). This 
newly founded dialogue mechanism was formalised 
during its first meeting in Brasilia in May 2005.71 It 
is a forum for coordination which is comprised of 34 
countries – 12 South American (the UNASUR mem-
bers) and 22 Arab – as well as the Secretary General 
of the Arab League. Five years later, the Brazilian met-
ropolis Rio de Janeiro was the venue for the Third 
Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations, an initiative 
launched in 2005 by Spain and Turkey and institu-
tionalised by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in 
2007. Its purpose is to provide a framework for co-
operation between the Western and Muslim world – 
with the aim of advancing cultural dialogue, eliminat-
ing socio-economic asymmetry and fighting terrorism. 
As “South America’s conflict manager”, Lula also 
attempted to play a bridging role in the Middle East 
and offered corresponding mediation services, par-
ticularly towards the end of his presidency. Together 
with Turkey, which, like Brazil, was a member of the 
UN Security Council in 2010, Lula arbitrated in the 
nuclear disagreement with Iran (more on this in the 
following chapter). Previously, in November 2009, 
he had received Iranian President Mahmoud Ahma-
dinejad in Brasilia – just a few months after the con-
tested June elections and the subsequent violent sup-
pression of mass demonstrations in Iran. Within two 
weeks, both the Israeli President Shimon Peres and 
the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud 
Abbas, paid an official visit to the Brazilian capital in 
November 2009.72 
The message that Brazil was trying to send – and 
not just through symbolic politics – was “we can work 
 
71 The second ASPA summit took place in 2009 in Qatar; 
the third meeting, which was originally planned for 2011 in 
Peru, took place a year later due to the “Arab Spring”. In addi-
tion to the “Cúpulas”, eleven ministerial meetings and seven 
meetings of senior officials were also held. 
72 The last time that an Israeli president officially visited 
Brazil was in the 1970s. 
with everyone”. The Lula government supported the 
right of the Palestinians to have a sovereign state and 
demanded a stop to the construction of Israeli settle-
ments within the occupied territories. At the same 
time, it rejected the Holocaust denial of the Iranian 
government as inacceptable. Within this conflict-
laden context, it was impossible to completely avoid 
receiving any blame. Abbas condemned the 2010 deci-
sion by Mercosur to approve a free trade agreement 
with Israel – the first agreement of this kind with any 
third party state – that did not exclude trade in prod-
ucts manufactured in the occupied territories.73 The 
governments of Israel and the USA, in turn, criticised 
Brazil’s diplomatic decision in November 2010 to 
recognise the Palestinian state according to its 1967 
boundaries. 
The strengthening of Brazil’s relations with the 
Middle East contributed to national economic develop-
ment as well as to a diversification of trading partners. 
Over the two Lula’s presidential terms, the level of 
trade between Brazil and this region tripled; between 
2003 and 2009, the volume increased from US$4.4 
billion to US$14.4 billion. Brazil only had a negative 
trade balance with Israel and Iraq; with the other 
countries across the region there was a surplus.74 
Moreover, Brazil signed a variety of economic, tech-
nical or financial cooperation agreements with coun-
tries like Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar and Kuwait. It also 
sent business delegations and participated in inter-
national forums and exhibitions taking place in the 
region. Thus Brazil achieved a previously unknown 
presence across this region. 
 
73 Maihold, Too Big a World? (see note 36), 5. 
74 All figures from the Ministério das Relações Exteriores. 
Secretaria de Planeamiento Diplomático, Balanço de Política 
Externa [Ministry for External Relations. Secretariat for Diplo-
matic Planning, Balance of Foreign Policy], 2003–2010 
(Brasilia). 
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North-South Conflict 
 
Political change often comes hand-in-hand with the 
emergence of new actors, who were previously not 
participants in the political game or were not mem-
bers of the group of “acknowledged players”. This 
holds true for the rise of Lula’s political party, the PT, 
to the national stage, and also for Brazil’s increased 
importance within an international context. The PT 
developed from an opposition labour party, viewed 
with suspicion by the country’s traditional elites, into 
a responsible and pragmatic governmental party 
which functions within the system. On a global level, 
however, “Lula’s Brazil” showed two faces. As an 
emerging power, the country operated along the cleav-
age between the South and the North. It entered into 
alliances with other countries that occupied similarly 
ambivalent positions within the international hier-
archy. The objective behind this building of groups 
was for these states to identify common interests and 
to assert themselves against the North. The impor-
tance of the USA and the EU for Brazil’s foreign policy 
decreased. Lula’s government called for a more bal-
anced global distribution of material and immaterial 
goods, and confidently pointed to Brazil’s socio-eco-
nomic achievements. These claims condensed into a 
pro-justice discourse, which was not directed against 
the system, but against the status quo. 
Anti-Status Quo- and Pro-Justice Discourse 
Even if Brazil’s foreign policy under Lula was not 
simply an extension of national economic policy or 
equivalent to foreign trade policy, the President’s 
socio-economic approach did radiate out into foreign 
policy. This is where a certain continuity that existed 
in Brazil’s foreign policy was reversed under Lula: 
While foreign policy once served national develop-
ment (introversion), the Brazilian development model 
under Lula was understood as a resource for foreign 
policy (extraversion). Former Minister of External Rela-
tions, Celso Lafer, defined the task of foreign policy as 
being the “translation of internal needs into external 
opportunities in order to expand society’s ability to 
command its own fate”.75 Based on this, one could say 
in Lula’s case that internal strengths were transformed 
into external opportunities to give the country a better 
position in the international context. Domestically, 
economic effectivity – defined as growth combined 
with redistribution – provided a source of political 
legitimacy at the domestic level and was presented 
accordingly abroad. 
Brazil’s achievements in combating poverty have 
accredited the country internationally in two different 
ways. On the one hand, they raised its profile as a 
“model example” and an “emerging donor” vis-à-vis 
other developing and emerging countries. “We have 
succeeded; we know how it works” – this was how 
Brazil understood its role within the context of its 
South-South relations. This line of reasoning was also 
used by the Itamaraty and its development agency, 
the ABC, for example, when addressing international 
cooperation projects with poorer countries. Brazil’s 
self-perception was further bolstered by important 
foreign players, who repeatedly pointed to “Lula’s 
Brazil” as a model for countries in the region as well 
as for the non-industrialised world, thereby recognis-
ing the government’s socio-economic achievements. 
On the other hand, Brazil played the role of a rebel 
with the revisionist76 attitude, denouncing existing 
power relations. In the same manner that he advocated 
solidarity among developing and emerging countries, 
Lula rhetorically promoted an equitable distribution 
of power and opportunity between the North and the 
South. The Brazilian government’s efforts towards a 
fairer allocation of resources within its own borders – 
through prominent social policy – therefore corre-
sponded to similar demands within a global context. 
In this regard, Lula’s criticism was directed, first, 
towards the prevailing rules of global trade and the 
international financial system; second, against West-
 
75 “Traduzir necessidades internas em possibilidades exter-
nas para ampliar o poder de controle de uma sociedad sobre 
o seu destino, que é no meu entender a tarefa da política 
externa, considerada como política pública”, Lafer, A identi-
dade internacional do Brasil (see note 28), 16. 
76 The term revisionism is used here in an analytical descrip-
tive sense and refers to efforts to call traditional theoretical 
convictions or historical policy relations into question. 
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ern expectations towards developing and emerging 
countries in terms of their efforts related to environ-
mental and climate change issues; third, against the 
oligarchic character of international institutions like 
the UN Security Council; and, fourth, against the geo-
political hegemony of the USA. Accordingly, social 
justice, as it relates to the distribution of material and 
immaterial goods, also became the dominant narra-
tive of the Lula government’s foreign policy. It was 
rooted in the construct of a vertical cleavage between 
the South and the North. At the same time, horizontal 
differences that become apparent if one uses other 
criteria such as the type of regime (e.g. democracy vs. 
autocracy) were neglected. 
Lula’s “uninhibited rapprochement” with Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in May 2010 can be interpreted within 
this context. At this time, Lula came out against sanc-
tions in the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program and 
he attempted to act as a mediator on this issue. Aside 
from the facts that Brazil has ratified the Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty77 and that there are doubts over Iran’s 
peaceful intentions, two factors proved decisive for 
the South American country. First, there was the issue 
of Iran’s right to the development of civil nuclear 
power – a right that Brazil has also claimed for itself. 
The Brazilian government viewed the North’s non-
proliferation policy as discriminatory. It accused 
the industrialised Western nations of not working 
towards disarmament, silently accepting de facto 
nuclear powers like India and Israel, and selectively 
holding fast to the Non-Proliferation Treaty when 
dealing with certain countries in the South. Second, 
Brazil sought to participate in the quest for a resolu-
tion to the nuclear dispute.78 In addition to Brazil’s 
traditional position – against sanctions, in favour 
of peaceful conflict resolution within a multilateral 
framework – in this specific case, a material as well as 
an immaterial dimension was evident in the vertical 
North-South cleavage. 
This cleavage also dominated human rights issues. 
Within multilateral bodies, Brazil had won the (bad) 
reputation of never voting against Cuba, but of always 
voting against Israel. In addition, it generally breaks 
with Argentina, Chile or Uruguay in its votes. Human 
 
77 Brazil has not, however, signed the supplementary proto-
col. It justified this decision by pointing to the fear that it 
could infringe on rights to industrial secrets. 
78 The text of the 17 May 2010 joint declaration from Iran, 
Turkey and Brazil is available at: http://www.cfr.org/brazil/ 
joint-declaration-iran-turkey-brazil-nuclear-fuel-may-2010/ 
p22140 (accessed 5 October 2011). 
rights organisations have repeatedly criticised Brazil 
for impeding the work of the Human Rights Council 
through its support of autocracies.79 The Lula govern-
ment unfailingly justified its position in terms of the 
vertical cleavage. It claimed to be acting against selec-
tive treatment which discriminates the countries in 
the South. Accordingly, the President’s foreign policy 
advisor, Marco Aurelio García, enjoyed announcing 
that his country was not responsible for handing 
out certificates of good conduct around the world.80 
Reference was often made of principles, such as state 
sovereignty and non-intervention into the internal 
affairs of other countries.81 
Brazil’s position was also controversial in a Latin 
American context. Lula garnered intense criticism 
after he spoke out during an interview on the case of 
the imprisoned Cuban dissidents Orlando Zapata and 
Guillermo Fariñas. Both had started hunger strikes; 
Zapata died as a consequence and Fariñas fell into an 
acute medical condition. Lula relativised his previous 
statement with the argument that a hunger strike can-
not be seen as a reason to release prisoners. He said that 
one must respect the right of the Cuban government 
to imprison people in line with existing national laws.82 
Overall, Lula’s foreign policy discourse was directed 
against the status quo, but did not have an antisys-
temic character. A number of examples illustrate this 
point. Brazil’s government did not, for instance, come 
out against the Bretton Woods Institutions, but rather 
pushed for greater autonomy vis-à-vis these institu-
tions. To this end, Brazil focused on two parallel strat-
egies. First, it reduced the influence of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) on its own policy by repaying its 
liabilities. In December 2005, Brazil’s Minister of 
Finance announced an early repayment of the remain-
 
79 For example Julie de Rivero’s statement “Brazil’s Support 
for Abusive Governments Is Undermining the Human Rights 
Council’s Performance”. Human Rights Watch, Brazil: Support 
Victims, Not Abusers. Lula Should Show Solidarity for Human Rights 
at UN Council, June 15, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/ 
2009/06/15/brazil-support-victims-not-abusers?print (accessed 
19 September 2011). 
80 As quoted, for example, by Andrés Oppenheimer, “Brazil 
Deserves Criticism for Awful Foreign Policy”, Miami Herald, 
24 June 2009. 
81 For example, in 2009 – on the one hand, to explain why 
Brazil abstained from voting on the resolutions on North 
Korea and the D.R. Congo, and on the other hand, with a view 
to the situation in Sri Lanka. 
82 Quoted in “Brazil’s Lula Criticised for Cuba Dissidents 
Comment”, BBC News, 11 March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/8561718.stm (accessed 19 September 2011). 
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der of its IMF debts totalling US$15.5 billion.83 At the 
same time, Brazil called for a reform of the IMF, which 
would provide a greater say to developing and emerg-
ing countries. Among other things, the Brazilian gov-
ernment worked within the G20 framework for a 
redistribution of quotas and voting rights. The goal 
was to give Southern states more influence within 
the institution and increase the legitimacy of the IMF 
itself. Reforms were then agreed on in 2008 and 2010, 
causing an increase in Brazil’s impact within the IMF. 
The country transformed from a major borrower into 
an important donor. In 2003, Lula had made a failed 
attempt to fill the post of WTO President with a Bra-
zilian diplomat, Ambassador Felipe de Seixas Correa.84 
These efforts to improve Brazil’s standing within inter-
national institutions cannot be understood as part of 
an antisystemic strategy. On the contrary, they char-
acterise the behaviour of an actor that has opted for 
“insider activism”, a type of reformism that would 
become effective within the system.85 
Brazil also called for a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council. The Lula government has levied the 
criticism that the low number of permanent members 
of this body reflects an outdated geo-political map of 
the world. It advocated an expansion of representation 
within the organisation so that developing and emerg-
ing nations as well as further regions would be in-
cluded. To gather support in favour of Brazil receiving 
a permanent seat, the country solicited nations in the 
North and the South, on its own continent – among 
Latin American governments and the USA – as well as 
within the context of IBSA and BRIC. A material argu-
ment that was made during the process was Brazil’s 
commitment to UN peacekeeping missions, above 
all the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH). Furthermore, it was alleged that the 
aim of making the institutions more democratic and 
representative was driving Brazil’s efforts. The title of 
 
83 Argentina did the same, Heribert Dieter, “Der IWF auf 
dem Weg in die Bedeutungslosigkeit?” [The IMF on a Path to 
Insignificance], Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 7 (2008): 9–14; 
idem, Europa und die Reform des IWF [Europe and the Reform of 
the IMF], SWP-Aktuell 16/2006 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, March 2006). 
84 Significantly, de Sexias Correa was not a Mercosur can-
didate. Uruguay presented its own recommendation, which 
was supported by Argentina, Stefan Schirm, “Leaders in Need 
of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance”, Euro-
pean Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010): 197–221 
(205f.). In 2013 the brazilian candidate, Roberto Azevêdo, was 
appointed as sixths WTO Director-General für a four-year term. 
85 Hurrell, “Brazil: What Kind of Rising State?” (see note 12). 
a March 2011 article by Minister of External Relations, 
Celso Amorim, got right to the heart of the Brazilian 
appeal: “Let us in.”86 Two aspects, in particular, of 
Amorim’s argumentation should be emphasised. 
Accordingly, the critical question was not whether 
the country had “earned” a permanent seat. The point 
was rather the Security Council’s legitimacy and asser-
tiveness, which would be dependent on the inclusion 
of emerging powers. The composition of the Council 
no longer corresponds with the “reality of global 
power relations” if one considers that the Brazilian 
economy is just as large as the French and British 
economies and, in contrast to these, was still showing 
strong growth rates. It is at this point that one can 
discern a logic of reasoning according to which inter-
national hierarchies are based on economic factors, 
and therefore “hard power”. In addition, however, 
Amorim also asserted that emerging powers like 
Brazil would bring new perspectives and soft power 
efforts to the Security Council. They would serve as a 
bridge to the developing world and could promote 
their acceptance of decisions of the “North” or “West”. 
Above all, Brazil has influence within its region – 
whether because the country’s decisions are followed 
or because it is a role model for others.87 
Brazil does not claim, however, that it fulfils a rep-
resentative role. The country is neither a representa-
tive of the global South nor of Latin America – as 
members of the Lula government repeatedly stated, it 
just represents itself. While the UN Security Council’s 
integration of Brazil into its ranks would lend it “a 
piece of the global South and Latin America”, Brazil 
would not be a spokesperson for third states. This line 
of argumentation is understandable from two differ-
ent perspectives. On the one hand, Brazil insists on its 
entitlement to represent its own interests in a manner 
similar to that of the USA or France. The focus is, 
therefore, on the unspoken ambition of being recog-
nised as belonging to the major powers and indus-
trialised nations and as a player on equal footing – on 
its own account and with its own rights. On the other 
hand, as long as important countries within the region 
such as Argentina and Mexico do not support Brazil’s 
call for a permanent seat, it can hardly claim to repre-
sent the sub-continent. Argentina and Mexico argue 
 
86 Celso Amorim, “Let Us In. Why Barack Obama Must Support 
Brazil’s Drive for a Permanent Seat on the UN Security Coun-
cil”, Foreign Policy, 14 March 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2011/03/14/let_us_in (accessed 19 September 2011). 
87 These arguments can be found in Amorim’s article in 
Foreign Policy, ibid. 
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that Brazil gaining a permanent seat would destroy the 
balance of power within the region.88 This type of re-
action alludes to the following tendency: a non-univer-
sal institution will not necessarily gain acceptance 
among outsiders if it becomes less exclusive by expand-
ing its membership. After all, states that remain exclud-
ed from the institution will now feel even more dis-
criminated against. This phenomenon of organisational 
sociology rebuts Brazil’s argument that, if it should 
gain a permanent seat, the UN Security Council will 
be more highly regarded by countries in the South. 
By understanding itself as an emerging power – 
together with other states – and seeking entrance into 
“oligarchic institutions” or participation in “hegemonic 
decision-making processes”, Brazil stands out from 
the South and aims for the North. The upgrading of 
Brazil’s position within the international system89 
implies the establishment of a hierarchy for the South. 
This in turn creates a point of tension for the egali-
tarian discourse, which subsists on the North-South 
dichotomy. Selective alliances like IBSA and BRIC or 
governance clubs like the G20 are already an expres-
sion of a “special class”; without doubt they would 
lose appeal for Brazil if they were to be significantly 
expanded. At the same time it is more the exception 
than the rule that Brazil and its strategies meet with 
real recognition from the South as well as the North – 
as was the case, for example, in its leadership role 
within the context of the UN stabilization mission in 
Haiti. In most cases, its twin ambitions of being a voice 
for the South and having its voice heard in the North 
result in a trade-off. 
Emerging Powers 
Lula’s government had a foreign policy focus on 
alliances with countries that could be understood as 
being “on an equal footing” with Brazil (coalitional 
politics). Acronyms like IBSA (for India, Brazil, South 
Africa) and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) do not 
 
88 Argentina was more of a proponent of increasing the 
number of non-permanent seats of the UN Security Council. 
For an argument against Brazil gaining a permanent seat, see 
the article by Mexico’s former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
“The Trouble with the BRICs. Why It’s Too Soon to Give Brazil 
and India Permanent Seats on the U.N. Security Council”, 
Foreign Policy, 14 March 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2011/03/14/the_trouble_with_the_brics (accessed 
19 September 2011). 
89 Schirm, “Leaders in Need of Followers” (see note 84). 
refer to groups of states that were formed according 
to strict criteria of homogeneity, or to groups that fit 
into categories like “developing countries”, “emerging 
countries” or “countries of the South”. Instead, these 
constellations highlight the pressure to adapt that 
confronts the world order established in 1945. At the 
same time, they underscore the increased demand for 
recognition shared by the actors participating in these 
“clubs” and, associated with this, their pursuit of 
status. Brazil’s search for partners enjoying a similar 
“global status” did not lead to the establishment of 
groups of “like-minded” states, but rather states with 
“equal weight”. The binding element is not so much a 
horizontal perspective of general accordance, shared 
positions on key elements of foreign policy, or sectoral 
interests (for example in the case of the WTO, G20 or 
the Cairns Group). A much more decisive element is 
the vertical perspective of a demarcation from the 
countries that are better positioned within the exist-
ing international hierarchy. The point of reference is, 
therefore, provided by those states in the international 
system that set the tone inside as well as outside the 
institutions and therefore shape the global order and 
act as norm-makers. 
One club format that Brazil entered into during 
the Lula government is the BRIC group. The name can 
be traced back to an acronym used since 2001 within 
a wide range of publications created by the financial 
services provider Goldman Sachs.90 The authors were 
focused on the increasing relative importance of the 
four economies within a global context, above all in 
terms of gross domestic product and growth rates. 
Initially, ministers and heads of state of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China gathered in a number of informal 
meetings that were held on the side during inter-
national events. Coordination among the countries 
began in September 2006. The first official summit 
 
90 Jim O’Neill, Building Better Global Economic BRICs, Global 
Economics Paper no. 66 (Goldman Sachs, 30 November 2001), 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-
pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf; Dominic Wilson and Roopa Puru-
shothaman, Dreaming with BRICS: The Path to 2050, Global Eco-
nomics Paper no. 99 (Goldman Sachs, 1 October 2003), http:// 
www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/ 
brics-dream.pdf; Jim O’Neill, Dominic Wilson, Roopa Puru-
shothaman and Anna Stupnytska, How Solid Are the BRICs?, 
Global Economics Paper no. 134 (Goldman Sachs, 1 December 
2005), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/ 
archive-pdfs/how-solid.pdf; Goldman Sachs, BRICs and Beyond 
(Global Investment Research, November 2007), http://www. 
goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/BRICs-and-Beyond. 
html (each accessed 31 August 2011). 
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between Lula, Dmitry Medvedev, Manmohan Singh 
and Hu Jintao took place in June 2009 in Yekaterin-
burg, the second in April 2010 in Brasilia.91 In April 
2011, the government representatives met in the 
Southern Chinese city of Sanya, and this time they 
were joined by South Africa’s President, Jacob Zuma. 
Since then, the addition of a fifth country resulted in 
the expanded acronym BRICS. The group of states sees 
itself as an informal mechanism that should serve to 
increase dialogue among the members, coordinate 
their positions on topics on the global agenda, and 
intensify their cooperation across specific policy areas 
on a governmental as well as civil society level. 
An additional format is IBSA, the dialogue forum 
established in June 2003 by the “Brasilia Declaration” 
including India, Brazil and South Africa. Its origins 
lie in talks that took place during the G8 summit in 
Evian, France, that same year. IBSA sees itself as a 
coordination mechanism between three multi-ethnic 
and multi-cultural democracies, which are all seeking 
to contribute to a new international architecture, to 
align their positions on global issues and to strength-
en their cooperation across diverse policy areas. From 
the perspective of Lula government, the relevance of 
IBSA was threefold: the format should (1) improve the 
standing of all three nations in multilateral forums 
and on a global level in general, (2) act as a catalyst for 
the development of relations among the members and 
(3) serve as a mechanism for South-South cooperation, 
particularly via the newly established financial funds.92 
The fact that the participating countries are located 
on different continents and, to a certain degree, have 
taken on a regional leadership role in their respective 
regions (or other states expect this of them), was seen 
as geo-strategic potential. Moreover, a common theme 
among all three countries is that they are all laying 
claim to a greater degree of participation and recog-
nition on a global level and are calling for a reform of 
global governance structures with the goal of shaping 
these into a more democratic, inclusive and represen-
tative form, thus increasing their legitimacy. 
 
91 Since 2006, sporadic meetings have been held among 
the four countries including the participation of ministers of 
various departments, representatives of development banks, 
heads of statistics offices, judges and civil society representa-
tives (from think tanks, business associations, cooperatives, etc.). 
92 Secretary Figeuiredo de Souza, IBSA-Department, Itama-
raty, in Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
Emerging Powers: India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) and the Future 
of South-South Cooporation, Special Report (Washington, D.C., 
August 2009). 
Even though IBSA has achieved a higher degree of 
institutionalisation than BRICS, both formats have the 
“fluid character” of coordinating mechanisms with in-
formal structures. They are based neither on a found-
ing document nor on statutes; they also lack a perma-
nent secretariat with an independent budget. Thus, 
they lack an implementation mechanism or an entity 
ensuring a consolidation of the operative activities. 
While Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations refers to 
IBSA and BRIC on its website as key issues within the 
context of inter-regional mechanisms, a stronger orga-
nisational anchoring of IBSA within the Itamaraty (in 
the Subsecretaria-General Politica II division) is noticeable. 
Overall, however, the depth of relations among the par-
ticipating actors in both formats remains at a low level. 
It has also proven difficult to achieve sectoral con-
vergence or intense cooperation across diverse policy 
areas. The socio-cultural and political heterogeneity 
within these groups is far too pronounced. The col-
lective benefits that the participating actors expect 
from coordinated action on a global level could be all 
the more crucial. The basis for this lies in their self-
perception as “middle powers” within an international 
context. Within the IBSA framework it seems to be 
easier to define what this “centre-field existence” 
means in concrete terms and what its implications are 
than for BRICS. None of the democratic states (Brazil, 
India and South Africa) is a member of the G8 or rep-
resented with a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council; at the same time, all three are part of the G20. 
Among the BRICS members, however, China and Rus-
sia have a permanent mandate on the Security Coun-
cil; Russia is also in the G8. In addition, both countries 
are not democratic regimes – or at least their demo-
cratic qualities are extremely limited – and they are 
acknowledged nuclear powers. India joins this group 
according to the „nuclear criterion“ as a de facto nu-
clear power (see Table 1, p. 24). At the same time, the 
differences within IBSA and BRICS in regards to cru-
cial international disputes are too pronounced for 
these groups to develop concerted action that is both 
substantial and assertive. Thus Brazil still has not recog-
nised China with full market economy status, while 
China has not issued clear support for Brazil’s call for 
a permanent seat on the UN Security Council – these 
are paradigmatic examples of a lack of convergence.93 
 
93 A further example is the attitude towards the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: While Brazil and 
South Africa ratified it and Russia at least signed it, India 
and China refused to sign. 
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Table 1 
Basic Statistics for Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa 
State Democracy Nuclear 
power 
Security  
Council (per-
manent seat) 
GDP  
(in billions 
of Euro) 
GDP per 
capita  
(in Euro) 
Growth rate 
2010  
(in percent) 
Population  
(in millions) 
Brazil  x  --  --  1526.4  7898.4  7.5  193.3 
China  --  x  x  4333.7  3230.7  10.5  1341.4 
India  x  x  --  1078.7  887.1  9.7  1215.9 
Russia  (--)  x  x  1114.1  7936.8  4.0  140.4 
South Africa  x  --  --  267.3  4175.2*  3.0  49.4* 
* Estimates based on statistics from 2008. 
Source: European Union, DG Trade, the statistics for 2010 correspond to estimates based on statistics from 2009. 
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Brazil as a Trade Power 
 
The Lula government’s foreign policy agenda included 
establishing a high profile in terms of trade policy. 
„Brazil as a trade power“ – the South American nation 
had never fostered this self-conception in the past. 
Under Lula, this was evident not only in a discursive 
sense, but also in a series of foreign policy decisions. 
It affected Brazil’s actions in formal and informal 
institutions like the WTO and G20 (developing and 
emerging countries), the expansion of relations with 
certain states and regions as well as the country’s 
aggressive „ethanol diplomacy“. Overall, the newly set 
priorities contributed to the USA and the EU losing 
importance in Brazil’s foreign trade, and to a diver-
sification shaped by South-South relations. Mercosur’s 
importance, however, has also decreased. This trend 
was less the result of targeted efforts by the govern-
ment and based more on Brazil’s exploitation of the 
opportunity offered by China’s ascent. Overall, how-
ever, Brazil’s trade capacity remained limited, and it 
can only be considered a „global trader“ in the export 
of raw materials. In the case of highly processed prod-
ucts, which are mostly sold within Latin America, 
Brazil remained in the role of a „regional trader“. It is 
solely within the bioethanol sector that Brazil has the 
potential to develop into a global trading power. 
Trends in External Trade 
During the 1990s, it was a dominant perception with-
in Brazil that an active trade policy could play an im-
portant role in the country’s economic development 
and that trade liberalisation could be the key. During 
Lula’s presidency, however, the rhetorical positioning 
of Brazil as an international trading power served less 
of a domestic development policy objective and much 
more a strategic foreign policy goal, namely expanding 
Brazil’s role as a global player. After all, Brazil’s domes-
tic market – and not foreign trade, drove the stable 
economic growth since 2003. Unlike other emerging 
nations, the economy was not driven by high invest-
ment rates, but rather internal demand for long and 
short-life consumer goods.94 These goods became avail-
able to segments of the population that had once lived 
in poverty and had now risen to the middle class. 
Additional data must be used to put the fact into 
perspective that Brazilian exports have risen in ab-
solute numbers and the country has continuously 
enjoyed a positive trade balance since 2000. First, 
although Brazil is Latin America’s largest economy, 
it is not one of the region’s most open economies. 
Among other things, this explains why the country 
was only lightly affected by the global financial and 
economic crisis. Brazil’s customs duties are not par-
ticularly low and its export quota (exports as a pro-
portion of GDP) is also not particularly high. The latter 
figure was only 24.8 percent over the 2007–2009 period. 
For the sake of comparison: China’s export quota was 
58.7 percent. Moreover, Brazil and Mercosur – unlike 
Chile, for example – did not follow any active strategy 
to enter into free trade agreements with other states 
or groups of states. Second, the nominal increase 
in Brazilian exports was not only based on increased 
demand for commodities, but rather also – and deci-
sively so – on the associated price increase. This devel-
opment contradicts the Prebisch-Singer thesis of a 
“secular decline in the terms of trade”.95 The growth 
recorded in Brazilian exports was, therefore, less a 
reflection of the volume and much more based on the 
value of the goods. Third, there was an appreciation of 
Brazil’s currency: imports developed more dynamically 
than exports, which caused the country’s positive 
 
94 Ricardo Sennes, Interesses brasileiros, estratégias e parcerias 
em política comercial [Brazilian Interests, Strategies and Partner-
ships in Trade Policy], manuscript presented within the con-
text of the Primeiro Fórum de Diálogo com o Brasil – “O Brasil na 
nova ordem global” [First Dialogue Forum with Brazil – “Brazil 
in the New Global Order”], (Hamburg: GIGA, February 2011), 1; 
Ricardo Sennes and Ângela Cristina Tepassê, “Brasil y China. 
Una nueva relación comercial” [Brazil and China. A New Trade 
Relationship], Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica 11, no. 1 (2011):  
22–32. 
95 According to the Prebisch-Singer thesis, it is disadvanta-
geous for exporters of primary goods (mostly developing coun-
tries) to be linked into the international division of labour – 
that is, the global economic system. This tends to worsen the 
exchange ratio between the exported raw materials and the 
imported processed products. 
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trade balance to constantly shrink. Fourth, unpro-
cessed products became increasingly important as 
part of the country’s exports. Between 1998 and 2009 
the proportion of low and medium level technology 
export goods decreased from 32 to 28.9 percent and 
from 25.9 to 18.1 percent, respectively. The proportion 
of unprocessed export goods, on the other hand, in-
creased markedly over the same timeframe from 19.9 
to 31 percent.96 Brazil’s range of exports has therefore 
increasingly centred on low value added products. 
Fifth, it should be mentioned that between 2000 and 
2009, Brazil’s share of global imports just rose from 
0.94 to 1.09 percent, while the volume of exports rose 
from 0.93 to 1.22 percent. In this sense, Brazil’s global 
weight has not increased significantly over the past 
ten years.97 
Trading Partners 
In 2009, 23.5 percent of Brazilian exports remained 
within Latin America. The sub-continent therefore 
took second place behind Asia (25.8 percent) as the 
largest consumer region.98 Latin America constituted 
the most important market for processed export 
goods. This trend was supported by regional trade 
liberalisation and competitive advantages enjoyed by 
national and foreign companies within Brazil vis-à-vis 
other companies in the region.99 Within the context 
of Lula’s regional trade strategy, however, Mercosur 
only played a rhetorical role.100 In Latin America and 
particularly in Brazil, the commitment to trade liber-
alisation receded continuously during Lula’s presiden-
cy. Lula thought it was more important to expand the 
integration system rather than deepen it. This is, for 
example, illustrated by the fact that he invited Vene-
zuela to join Mercosur. The member states have im-
plemented less than 40 percent of Mercosur’s acquis 
communautaire – its community norms – and Brazil 
 
96 Statistics from the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco Central 
do Brasil), quoted in Sennes, Interesses brasileiros (see note 94), 3. 
97 Statistics from the IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, 
October 2010. 
98 Statistics from the Secretaria de Comércio Exterior (SECEX) 
– Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio 
Exterior (MEDIC), quoted in Sennes, Interesses brasileiros (see 
note 94), 4. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Janina Onuki, “Interesses comerciais brasileiros na 
América do Sul” [Brazilian Commercial Interests in South 
America], in O Brasil no conetxto político regional, ed. Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung (see note 52), 165–76 (169). 
remains below the average. In addition, during Lula’s 
second term, not only was an increased bilateralisa-
tion between Argentina and Brazil evident within the 
group, but also a considerable worsening of trade and 
economic relations between these two states. Ad hoc 
protectionist measures increasingly became the rule 
rather than the exception. As a result, for Brazil, 
Mercosur’s relevance fell in terms of trade policy in 
two regards. For one thing, its material weight de-
creased, with Mercosur only making up 10 percent of 
Brazil’s overall foreign trade in 2009.101 For another, 
Mercosur has long since lost the function that it was 
initially meant to fulfil when it was created: enabling 
integration into global markets in the spirit of open 
regionalism. 
The decreasing impetus towards free trade in the 
region, however, correlated with a more recent ten-
dency towards growing Brazilian investment in Latin 
America. For a number of years, Mercosur has offered 
Brazil less of a springboard to the global market and 
more of a first platform for domestic companies on 
the path to internationalisation.102 This “South Ameri-
canisation” of Brazilian companies was pushed by 
their highly developed lobbying abilities and a de-
nationalisation process of the industry in the neigh-
bouring countries, particularly in Argentina. Over 
the 2001–2008 period, Brazil’s investments in Latin 
America and the Caribbean were heavily focused on 
Mercosur (78.6 percent). Other important target areas 
were Chile and the Andean Community103 (7.5 percent 
each). Within South America, Brazil invested first and 
foremost in acquisitions (32.1 percent), expansions 
(17.3 percent) and strategic fusions (10 percent). The 
construction of new manufacturing plants or creation 
of additional jobs occurred far less frequently. Brazil’s 
acquisitions within South America were focused on 
capital-intensive companies without the potential for 
 
101 Statistics for 2009 from Eurostat. During the 1990s, the 
Mercosur proportion of Brazil’s overall foreign trade reached 
the 20 percent mark. 
102 The following statistics and many of the arguments are 
based on: Daniela Perrota, Gastón Fulgquet and Eugenia In-
chauspe, Luces y sombras de la internacionalización de las empresas 
brasileñas en Sudamérica: ¿integración o interacción? [Light and 
Shadow of the Internationalisation of Brazilian Companies 
in South America: Integration or Interaction?], (Buenos Aires: 
Nueva Sociedad [un proyecto de Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung], 
2011), http://www.riosvivos.org.br/arquivos/site_noticias_ 
1717826015.pdf (accessed 27 October 2011). 
103 The Andean Community (Comunidad Andina de Nacio-
nes, CAN) is an integration system that currently consists of 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. 
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promoting productive complementarity in the region 
or the development of value chains. This added an 
additional structural asymmetry to Mercosur. Brazil’s 
investment policy within the region was to some 
extent a substitute for intra-regional trade. In addi-
tion, it constituted a strategy for reducing export 
costs, since for monetary policy reasons it was less 
expensive to ship international exports from Argentina 
than from Brazil. This “trade redirection” reveals that 
there is no common Mercosur market and not even a 
common external tariff. 
Brazil’s trade relations with Africa are even less 
essential to the country’s international image as a 
trading power. They represent a rather modest addi-
tion to Brazil’s efforts of diversifying its foreign trade 
partner structure – and a means to establishing itself 
politically and economically on the continent. In 2010, 
Africa accounted for 4.5 percent and 6.6 percent, 
respectively, of Brazil’s exports and imports (2009: 5.7 
and 9.1 percent, respectively).104 The trade balance for 
Brazil is negative (at about US$–2 billion).105 The lion’s 
share of foreign trade is conducted with just three 
countries: Nigeria, Angola and South Africa. Together, 
they purchase around half of Brazil’s exports to Africa, 
while at the same time two-thirds of Brazil’s African 
imports originated in these three countries. It was 
almost exclusively oil that Brazil imports from Nigeria 
(Brazil’s largest African provider) and Angola (Brazil’s 
most important trading partner from within the Por-
tuguese-Speaking African Countries, PALOP, and its 
largest importer on the continent). In total, Africa 
provided 65.2 percent of Brazil’s total oil imports.106 
Other PALOP states are rather unimportant trade part-
ners, which mainly purchase Brazilian products. 
 
104 Statistics from the Ministerio do Desenvolvimento, In-
dústria e Comércio Exterior, Secretaria de Comércio Exterior, 
Conhecendo o Brasil em Números [Ministry for Development, 
Industry and External Commerce. Secretariat for External 
Commerce, Brazil in Numbers], October 2010, http://www. 
mdic.gov.br/arquivos/dwnl_1278014345.pdf (accessed 19 Sep-
tember 2011). 
105 The volume of Brazil’s exports to Africa was approxi-
mately US$9.2 billion in 2010. In the same year, Brazil’s im-
ports from Africa totalled US$11.3 billion, see ibid. 
106 Data from the Agencia Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural 
e Biocombustíveis [National Agency of Petroleum, Natural 
Gas and Biofuels], http://www.anp.gov.br (accessed 15 Sep-
tember 2011). 
Table 2 
Proportion of Trade with China, India, Russia and 
South Africa of Brazil’s Overall Trade (2009, in percent; 
respective rank in parentheses) 
Partner Import Export Total trade 
China  12.8 (3)  12.6 (2)  12.7 (3) 
India  1.8 (10)  2.1 (7)  2.0 (9) 
Russia  1.1 (15)  1.9 (8)  1.5 (12) 
South Africa  0.4 (33)  0.9 (25)  0.6 (29) 
Source: European Union, DG Trade, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/html/113359.htm (accessed 21 September 2011). 
Building alliances with other “middle powers” within 
the context of IBSA and BRICS was also justified using 
the argument that these states were looking to expand 
the increased levels of trade among the partners even 
further. As shown in Table 2, China is Brazil’s only 
major import and export partner within IBSA and 
BRICS. Conversely, Brazil is less relevant for China as 
a trade partner (ranked 10th with 2 percent of total 
trade) and of even less importance for Russia (1 per-
cent, ranked 11th), South Africa (1.4 percent, ranked 
16th) and India (1.1 percent, ranked 19th).107 It may 
be one of the declared objectives of IBSA and BRICS 
to promote bilateral trade, but this is no simple task, 
since the participating countries each belong to dif-
ferent free trade areas and integration systems. As an 
(incomplete) customs union, Mercosur limits Brazil’s 
options for unilaterally entering into trade agree-
ments with third states. At the same time, China has 
become the largest purchaser of Brazilian exports 
(12.6 percent) among national markets and has there-
by pushed the USA (10.6 percent) and Argentina (8.4 
percent) down to the second and third place. Among 
groups of states, the EU remains Brazil’s largest sales 
market (22.5 percent).108 The dominant role played by 
China’s demand not only for Brazilian raw materials, 
but for those of Latin America in general, has created 
an imbalance in the trade relations that was described 
by one expert as follows: “Latin America has linked 
itself to the motor of the 21st century’s global economy 
with a 19th century industrial structure.”109 Brazil’s 
 
107 Trade statistics from the DG Trade, EU, http://ec.europa. 
eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics 
(accessed 19 September 2011). 
108 Statistics from the DG Trade, EU, March 2011, http:// 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113359.
pdf (accessed 19 September 2011). 
109 According to Osvaldo Rosales, Director of the Trade and 
Integration Division of the Economic Comission for Latin 
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trade relations with China therefore have reproduced 
the same imbalance that also characterises trade 
between Brazil and the industrialised nations of the 
West. 
In the meantime, Brazil fostered its own ambitions 
of developing into a global oil exporter. The discovery 
of extensive oil reserves in the Pré-Sal area off Brazil’s 
Atlantic coast contributed to these ambitions.110 Over 
the 2009–2010 period, daily oil production increased 
by 5.6 percent (somewhat more than the annual aver-
age over the past ten years) and reached a level of 750 
million barrels per day. In regards to foreign trade 
in oil, the trend of shrinking imports and growing 
exports is continuing. In 2010, oil imports receded by 
13.8 percent to 123.6 million barrels, while oil exports 
increased by 20.1 percent to 230.5 million barrels. 
The Asia-Pacific region was the largest purchaser of 
Brazilian oil exports (33.4 percent) with China (25.5 
percent) and India (7.5 percent) in first and second 
place. Brazil exported 23.8 percent of its oil to the 
USA. Despite the discovery of new reserves and the 
expansion of production and exports, Brazil was still 
not among the top-10 countries; the South American 
state is ranked 15th among the countries with the 
largest oil reserves,111 and 12th among oil producers. 
It is only in the biofuels sector that Brazil has the 
potential to become a “global trader” in the biofuels 
sector.112 The country was responsible for 34 percent 
of global ethanol production and 10 percent of bio-
diesel production. As the second largest manufacturer 
of bioethanol (after the USA with 54 percent), Brazil 
enjoyed important competitive advantages. This gives 
it the opportunity to conquer a global market that is 
 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) of the UN, in the context 
of the 56th discussion on globalisation at the KfW Entwick-
lungsbank, Berlin, 23 November 2010, see the article on this 
event: Michael Schmidt, “Warum Lateinamerika so gut da-
steht” [Why Latin America Is So Well Positioned], Tagesspiegel 
online, 25 November 2010, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/ 
wirtschaft/teil-der-loesung/3269490.html (accessed 19 Sep-
tember 2011). 
110 The Pré-sal reserves are located in an area that spans 800 
kilometres between Espírito Santo and Santa Catarina, five to 
seven klometres beneath the sea floor. The following statistics 
come from the Agencia Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural e 
Biocombustíveis [National Agency for Petroleum, Gas and Bio-
fuels], http://www.anp.gov.br (accessed 15 September 2011). 
111 Of the proven oil reserves, 93.6 percent are located off-
shore and 6.4 percent onshore. 
112 Arguments and statistics in this section come from: 
Sybille Acosta and Claudia Zilla, Markets and Minds. Trade and 
Value Conflicts over Biofuels, SWP Research Paper 7/2011 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2011). 
still establishing. In 2011, only 10 percent of the 
ethanol used in the world were traded internationally. 
The only significant trade flows were Brazil’s exports 
to the USA and the EU. Brazil’s manufacturing capac-
ities for biofuels arose from the Pró-Álcool programme 
of the 1970s, which was developed in order to substi-
tute for oil imports – the objective was energy secu-
rity. The Lula government’s “ethanol diplomacy”, in 
contrast, was heavily focused on exports, even though 
only 20 percent of the bioethanol produced in the 
country was exported. 
Brazil used an international bioethanol campaign 
to raise its profile as an “alternative energy power”. 
Biofuels were presented as a contribution to global 
energy security, environmental protection and socio-
economic development in poorer countries. The 
Brazilian government lobbied to establish an inter-
national market for biofuels and to reduce tariffs 
(currently over 50 percent in the EU and 25 percent 
in the USA). A further goal was to classify ethanol as 
an environmental good, and biodiesel as a commod-
ity, each with a globally consistent pricing structure. 
Within this context, Brazil participated in various 
multilateral cooperation mechanisms, such as the 
Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP) and the Inter-
national Biofuels Forum (IBF). At the same time, the 
country fostered bilateral partnerships in the biofuels 
sector, for example with the USA and Germany. 
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Foreign Policy Tradition and Lula’s Legacy 
 
Without a doubt, a foreign policy change took place 
during the eight-year Lula presidency. Within Brazil 
itself, the changes were attentively followed and 
became subject to controversial debate. This is no 
surprise considering that Brazil’s diplomacy has 
traditionally been led by a pronounced historical 
consciousness.113 In actual terms, however, the change 
of course was less pronounced than Lula claimed in 
his speeches. The President chose a discursive strategy, 
which placed an inordinate emphasis on breaking 
with the past – and not just in terms of foreign policy 
or in comparison with his predecessor Cardoso. “Never 
before in the country’s history” was a rhetorical for-
mula with which Lula started almost every one of his 
speeches in order to establish the interpretive frame-
work for the “extraordinary” accomplishments of his 
government. Many of the values underpinning Lula’s 
foreign policy, however, could actually be derived 
entirely from national traditions. In this respect, the 
foreign policy agenda changed more than its norma-
tive foundation. Brazil’s foreign policy self-conception, 
which developed historically, even remained largely 
intact in the face of some deviations and changes of 
policy, since it is impossible for change to take place 
independently of identity, even if it is able to change 
this identity. 
The End of Foreign Policy Consensus 
A key aspect of the foreign policy change that took 
place in “Lula’s Brazil” was the erosion of the Itama-
raty’s monopoly status. This gets at the manner in 
which foreign policy is made within the country. 
Lula’s political party, the PT, took over a decisive role. 
Even if the “philosophical identification” was not com-
plete, hardly any other policy area114 showed such a 
degree of conformity between what the PT elaborated 
 
113 Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa, “Diplomacia e História: 
política externa e identidade nacional brasileira” [Diplomacy 
and History: External Policy and Brazil’s National Identity], 
Política Externa 9, no. 1 (2000): 22–32 (25). 
114 This level of accord is perhaps most likely to be found in 
terms of social policy. 
and what was actually implemented.115 Foreign 
policy, therefore, became “suspected of ideology” – 
also because it was shaped by the President’s action-
ism, because it broke in many regards with traditional 
guidelines, and because it touched on the system of 
norms in which the Itamaraty’s ministerial logic had 
formerly been ingrained. Here the question arises 
as to whether a policy that has distanced itself from 
traditional majority positions may only have a real 
chance of being implemented if it is personality-
driven, based on anti-hegemonic pathos and, at the 
same time, laying claim to prestige and status. Or 
could it be that this sort of “pyrotechnic style”, which 
places emphasis on breaking with tradition rather 
than maintaining continuity, is all too provocative 
and makes it more difficult to achieve consensus? In 
any case, Lula’s presidency provides evidence for both 
explanatory models. 
Ideology usually comes up as a topic when the pre-
vailing consensus diminishes and cleavages become 
visible. Political objectives and different positions are 
viewed as “ideological” (as opposed, for example, to 
economic interests) if they jar with one’s own objec-
tives or views, or those of the mainstream, and if they 
question consolidated interest hierarchies. The claim 
that there is, on the one hand, an ideological policy 
and, on the other, a purely interest-driven policy, is 
based on the naïve assumption116 that interests are 
objective facts and value-neutral matters.117 Political 
 
115 Roberto de Almeida, “Uma nova ‘arquitetura’ diplo-
mática?” (see note 22), 101. 
116 This assumption can be found in the context of the 
realist school of international relations. 
117 “In order to support this contention it is important 
to note that interests need to be defined in order to come to 
exist. Interests are nothing in themselves and only something 
in connection with a someone for whom they are interests”, 
Erik Ringmar, “The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against 
the West”, Cooperation and Conflict, no. 37 (2002): 115–36 (118). 
Ringmar continues with this line of argumentation on the 
same page: “It follows, as a point of logic, that questions 
regarding interests can only begin to be discussed once ques-
tions regarding identities have been settled, at least in a pre-
liminary fashion. It is only once we know who we are that we 
can know what we want. If this point is accepted, a theory of 
rational action will always come to presuppose a theory of 
how identities are created, established and maintained.” 
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science analyses that draw, for example, the conclu-
sion that the Lula government tended not to define 
“the” national interests realistically, but instead 
normatively, substantiate (explicitly) the value-driven 
policy of the President, but by the same token confirm 
(implicitly) the similarly value-driven arguments of 
the authors. It is just because the two value systems 
do not converge that their existence is “detected” in 
the first place by the other.118 An associated claim 
is similarly dependent on perspective, namely, that 
during the Lula government foreign policy was not 
used to serve the state, but rather the political party, 
which is why it lost the traditional character of policy 
shaped by continuity (Política de Estado).119 Contrary 
to such lines of argumentation, which naturalise and 
de-subjectify the notion of interests, this study takes 
the stance that state interests are not objectively 
predetermined, but are instead defined by the actors 
themselves, i.e. socially constructed. The extent to 
which material interests are relevant depends on im-
material or normative aspects. The transformation 
that many critics of Lula describe goes back to the fact 
that the Itamaraty has lost its technocratic monopoly 
over foreign policy and the cross-party consensus that 
once lent stability to this policy area eroded. The more 
“visible” and “prominent” foreign policy becomes, the 
greater the probability that it will become the object 
of party political disagreements. While the discord 
 
118 On this point, a quotation from an interview with Lula’s 
foreign policy advisor, Marco Aurelio García, “Brasil: un gi-
gante que despierta”, Le Monde Diplomatique en español, 1 Octo-
ber 2010: “Afirmar que la política externa es una política de 
Estado [en Brasil] tiene una dosis de verdad, pero los críticos 
de la política externa de Lula han usado esa tesis para defen-
der posiciones conservadoras, atacándonos con el discurso 
de que llevamos adelante una política externa ‘ideológica’. La 
verdad es que nunca tuvimos en Brasil una política externa 
librada de, entre comillas, algún tipo de ‘contaminación ideo-
lógica’, porque tenemos ideas distintas en la cabeza, y eso es 
bueno.” [The claim that Brazil’s foreign policy is state policy 
has an element of truth to it, but critics of Lula’s foreign 
policy have used this thesis to defend conservative positions 
and to attack us with the argument that we follow an ‘ideo-
logical’ foreign policy. It is correct that we have never had a 
foreign policy in Brazil that – in quotation marks – was free 
of any sort of ‘ideological contamination’ because we all have 
different ideas in our minds and this is a good thing.] 
119 See among others, Rubens Recupero, “À sombra de 
Charles de Gaulle: Uma diplomacia carismática e intrasferí-
vel. A política externa do governo Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
(2003–2010)” [The Shadow of Charles de Gaulle: Charismatic 
and Non-Transferable Diplomacy. The Foreign Policy of the 
Government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010)], Nuevos 
Estudios, CEBRAP, no. 87 (July 2010): 35–58. 
over economic policy has decreased considerably, 
foreign policy has become a contested policy. Brazil’s 
external relations increasingly became the object of 
controversial disputes within the political and diplo-
matic elite as well as within society. This end to for-
eign policy consensus is the actual unprecedented 
element of the “Lula Era”. Since policy generally grows 
more unpredictable through a diversity of interests, it 
can be expected that Brazil’s foreign policy character-
ised by continuity will diminish over the long term 
in favour of a “government policy tonality”. In other 
words, changes in political power will have a greater 
tendency to entail shifts in foreign policy. This also 
increases the potential for conflict between actors 
and institutions involved in the foreign policy deci-
sion-making process. After all, a fragmented context 
in which the Ministry of External Relations has lost 
the capacity to control foreign policy bolsters the 
hegemony of the President. 
Growing of a Giant 
Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa, a Brazilian diplomat and 
former Ambassador to Germany, spoke in 2000 of the 
“trinity” of Brazil’s national feeling – composed of 
national unity, geographical size and a vision promis-
ing economic prosperity.120 Under Lula, this triad also 
shaped Brazilian identity and therefore remained the 
basis of foreign policy. 
1. Brazil regards national unity as its greatest 
value. This can be explained, on the one hand, histori-
cally from the experience of witnessing the disintegra-
tion of Spain’s Latin American colonies into numerous 
different republics. On the other hand, a societal cohe-
sion is also postulated, which exists despite all the so-
cial, cultural and regional differences that arose due to 
the country’s asymmetric and unjust development.121 
2. The appreciation of geographical size forms a 
constant throughout Brazil’s history. It is based on 
three phases of development of foreign policy regard-
ing national territory. In the first period of nation-
building, the “definition of the territory” was estab-
lished; during this time, Brazil followed an expansion-
ist foreign policy within South America. In a second 
phase of “consolidation of the territory”, the country’s 
leaders strove to expand the state monopoly on the 
use of force across the Brazilian territory and to 
 
120 Seixas Corrêa, “Diplomacia e História” (see note 113). 
121 Words of Cardoso paraphrased in ibid., 27. 
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defend this monopoly against other states. A third 
phase aimed at the “development of the national 
territory” – now foreign policy was used to foster 
socio-economic progress in the country. These three 
phases could be supplemented with a fourth “Lula-ist” 
period,122 which was dedicated to a “conquest of inter-
national territory”. It was characteristic of this phase 
that national size and domestic socio-economic 
achievements were used for foreign policy purposes. 
3. Brazil’s forward-looking orientation was pro-
moted by a present characterised by deep-seated socio-
economic deficits and by a relatively short past – since 
there was hardly anything in the past to cling to, every-
thing seemed to lie ahead. This awakened a comfort-
ing hope that national unity and geographic size would 
sooner or later materialize as prosperity and wealth. 
It is possible to continue along with this thought as 
follows: the socio-economic achievements of the Lula 
government have now almost fulfilled earlier hopes 
and have therefore fed into the demand that the 
country should now, corresponding to its material 
and immaterial resources, receive greater recognition 
and a more important role on a global level. 
De Seixas Corrêa added three additional guiding 
principles to the normative triad of unity, size and 
vision, which have historically shaped Brazil’s foreign 
policy projection: nationalism (which originally had 
an expansionist orientation, but then acquired a 
development-oriented function aimed at integrating 
the national territory),123 equality between sovereign 
states and pragmatism. Over the centuries, all three 
elements fed Brazil’s aspirations of independence. 
Previously, an attempt had been made to achieve this 
through alienation and retreat, or in other words a 
defensive protectionist strategy – in the sense of an 
introverted giant. Under Lula, however, an offensive 
and active approach dominated: autonomy was now 
to be achieved through foreign policy participation 
and diversification. The objective consequently be-
came a greater engagement in international organi-
sations and formats as well as an expansion in the 
number and diversity of its foreign policy partners. 
In terms of foreign trade, however, Lula’s policy 
remained constricted by the ambivalence typical of 
 
122 The start of this phase, however, can already be pin-
pointed in the Cardoso government. He paved the way for 
economic stability and socio-economic development (through 
pronounced social policy) and for a more active foreign policy. 
123 Lafer, A identidade internacional do Brasil (see note 28), 87; 
Hélio Jaguaribe, O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira [Nation-
alism in Brazil Today], (Rio de Janeiro, 1958), 52. 
Brazil – swinging between an open liberal model and a 
closed interventionist model. An additional contradic-
tion was Brazil’s simultaneous identification with the 
developed North and the under-developed South. This 
tension generated by national and international asym-
metries is not new. Over the past decade, however, it 
became an increasingly sensitive issue, as Brazil’s for-
eign relations with Northern and Southern groups of 
states became more visible and dense. 
The combination of nationalist tendencies, a fixa-
tion on sovereignty and a pragmatic attitude may 
explain why among Brazil’s economic and political 
elite a foreign policy discourse was dominating, which 
continued – if not increasingly so – to carry realist 
arguments.124 After President Lula’s two terms, it 
seemed that the promise of prosperity had been ful-
filled. Then this was supposed to be translated into a 
corresponding position of power within the global 
hierarchy – this was a point of agreement between the 
“Lulistas” and the “non-Lulistas” or “anti-Lulistas”. For 
the view had spread across party lines in Brazil that 
the country had gained a greater scope for foreign 
policy action over the past decade and therefore had 
earned a larger voice on a global level. Representatives 
of opposition parties and members of past govern-
ments concur that Brazil was then “a country that 
counts”;125 internationally. Its influence had never 
been as strong as under the presidency of Lula. 
During the government of Dilma Rousseff and her 
successor Michel Temer, Brazil has notably scaled 
down its regional and international engagement. 
Domestic political and economic challenges, corrup-
tion scandals as well as coalition instability have put 
foreign policy in the back burner. While Dilma saw 
herself still in a continuity line with Lula, Temer 
stresses the need for a change in foreign policy. It still 
remains to be seen, if Brazil will be able to consolidate 
a new approach and where this will lead to. 
 
124 Here “realism” refers to the realist school of inter-
national relations. 
125 According to the assessment of the former Minister of 
External Relations during the Cardoso government, Luiz 
Felipe Lampreia, who is now Director of the Council for Inter-
national Affairs of the Industry Federation of Rio de Janeiro), 
quoted in “El gobierno de Brasil marcaría distancia con Vene-
zuela y se acercaría a EE.UU” [Brazil’s Government Would Dis-
tance Itself from Venezuela and Approach the USA], Infolatam, 
29 March 2011, http://www.infolatam.com/2011/03/29/el-
gobierno-de-brasil-marcaria-distancia-con-venezuela-y-se-
acercaria-a-ee-uu/ (accessed 19 September 2011). 
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Abbreviations 
ABC Agência Brasileira de Cooperaçao (Development 
Agency in Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations) 
ASA Africa-South America Summit 
ASACOF Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (of the ASA) 
ASPA Cúpula América do Sul – Países Árabes  
(Summit of South American – Arab States) 
BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India, China 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
CAMEX Câmara de Comércio Exterior  
(Chamber of Commerce) 
CDS Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano  
(South American Defence Council) 
CEBRAP Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento 
(Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning, São 
Paulo) 
CNI Confederação Nacional da Indústria  
(National Confederation of Industry) 
CPLP Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa 
(Community of Portuguese Language Countries) 
DC Development Cooperation 
DG Trade Directorate General for Trade of the European 
Commission 
DPAD Division of Environmental Policy and Sustainable 
Development 
GBEP Global Bioenergy Partnership 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies 
(Hamburg) 
IBF International Biofuels Forum 
IBOPE Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística 
(Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics) 
IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa 
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(London) 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
MDIC Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e 
Comércio Exterior (Ministry for Development, 
Industry and External Commerce) 
Mercosur Mercado Común del Sur  
(Southern Common Market) 
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OAS Organisation of American States 
PALOP Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa 
(Portuguese-Speaking African Countries) 
PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira  
(Brazilian Social Democracy Party) 
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party) 
TC Technical Cooperation 
UNASUR Unión de Naciones Suramericanas  
(Union of South American Nations) 
WTO World Trade Organization 
ZPCAS Zona de Paz y Cooperación del Atlántico Sur  
(South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone) 
